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Glasnost, or openness, was initiated by Mikhail S. Gorbachev in the former Soviet 
Union as a supplement to his primary reform of perestroika, or re-structuring. This 
study focuses on the glasnost reform, arguing that while perestroika addressed 
economics glasnost encouraged democratization in society. Primarily, the study 
examines the social discourse that was ultimately affected as a result of glasnost. The 
societal issues that erupted after glasnost, exhibited defiance against the regime, 
particularly m terms of fundamental liberties of expression and the availability of 
information. 
The study also examines differences in interpretation of Gorbachev and the Soviet 
population, a significant point in the explanation as to why the Communist Party 
could not sustain democratic reform and maintain control of the nation. The Soviet 
consciousness was conditioned by historical experience to concede to authoritarian 
political systems, and the study builds an argument that Gorbachev was a product of 
his culture. Therefore, the political system which V.I. Lenin erected in October 1917 
served to perpetuate a mentality of political autocracy and social repression. 
The presence of glasnost was literally referred to by Gorbachev as democratization, 
a definition which the study examines in particular to understand why glasnost 
escaped his objectives and brought about the failure of the Soviet Union under 
Communist power. The term democracy is therefore treated as an intangible power in 
itself that surpassed the control of the Party and in fact brought the process of 
democracy to the public consciousness by allowing fi^eedom of information. 
In the study a great amount of care was given to analyze Russian scholars and 
authors in order to gain their unique perspective. In examining the results brought 
about by glasnost's liberalizing effects the study strives to utilize specific Russian 
citizens' accounts of glasnost. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
On Christmas Day of 1991 the red flag of flie Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was 
unceremoniously lowered, oflBcially marking the end of that nation's existence. Earlier 
on tiiat same day Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev resigned his position as Soviet 
President, the unexpected culmination of his 6-ye<D' leadership of a global superpower. 
The intrigue of such hi^ political drama is that the national failure of the Soviet Union 
was not due to external causes, but rather the result of an internal political gamble on the 
part of Gorbachev to strengttien and stabilize the Soviet Union's economic and political 
situation. Perhaps the most ironic aspect of &e Soviet Union's demise was that the 
Commimist Party, under the direction of Gorbachev, played the lead role in its own fall 
from power. 
Upon ascending to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union on March 11, 1985, Gorbachev became leader of an empire that was 
increasingly stumbling in its ability to compete with other industrialized states, 
particularly in terms of economics. Jeny Hough accounts for the timeline of 
Gorbachev's actions in beginning the reform process that was intended to redirect the 
nation's progress. 
Less than six months into office, Mikhail Gorbachev told the editors of Time that 
he had a "grandiose" domestic program in mind. Hjs language became more 
radical at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in Februaiy-March 1986. By July 
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1986 he had become still more radical, equating perestroika with revolution—in 
all spheres of life, not just the economy. In 1986 he backed his words with a 
series of laws and decrees that began the process of economic reform. The laws 
were all good early steps. From Ihe fall of 1986 he increasingly emphasized 
democratization. ̂  
Perestroika. or restructuring, was Gorbachev's primary reform in his objective for 
resurrecting the Soviet economic situation. His publication of 1987 was entitled 
Perestroika. demonstrating Gorbachev's sincere investment in his reform for reviving the 
economy. Change was imperative if the Soviet Union were to sustain itself 
internationally and domestically, a fact that Gorbachev addresses in his volume 
Perestroika. Like his predecessors, Grorbachev assessed the problem as primarily 
economic in nature. However, unlike former Russian and Soviet leaders, Gorbachev was 
compelled to initiate the reform glasnost or openness, in an attempt to address corruption 
in the Soviet state. As he explained in Perestroika. the only inhibitor to the success of the 
nation's economic resurgence was a lack of social democracy, active participation in the 
nation's progressive development, hi Gorbachev's report regarding the Twenty-Seventh 
Party Congress, he calls for "the elimination of everything that interferes with 
development,"^ and in Perestroika he urges: 
[T]he development of democracy, criticism, and glasnost. It is no longer a 
question of whether the CPSU Central Committee will continue the policy of 
glasnost through the press and the other mass media and with the active 
participation of citizens. We need glasnost as we need air.^ 
' Jeny Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR. 1985-1991 (Washington D.C.. The 
Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 103. 
 ̂Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 173. 
 ̂ Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Pere.stroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & 
Row Publishers, 1987), 78. 
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However, by initiating the glasnost reform Gorbachev imintentionally released a 
social revolution within his own nation's borders that spiraled out of control, 
challenging the Communist Party as the Soviet Union's single political authority and 
ultimately driving Gorbachev and the Party system out of power. 
This thesis aigues that glasnost encouraged democratization in the areas of 
commimication and information which created a social revolution against the political 
authority of the Commimist Party, consequently leading to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The hypothesis will be supported by evaluating two distinct factors that 
contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. First, Gorbachev's reform, 
glasnost, will be analyzed according to the theoretical definition of democratization and 
also according to Gorbachev's intended definition, a point that is the crux of the issue. It 
is essential to the argument of fliis thesis to establish that Gorbachev used glasnost in a 
specific way, hoping that the reform would stimulate the population to embrace the 
socialist democratic ideal. Glasnost, according to one particular accepted theoretical 
defbtiition, suggests a specific direction but according to another interpretation, addresses 
a diversity of opinions and interpretations. The second factor that the thesis argues 
contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union revolves around the political 
authoritarianism possessed by the Communist Party Because glasnost was such an 
abstract concept, the refonn escaped Gorbachev's control and literally clashed with the 
rigid dogma of the Communist Party. Glasnost's democratic nature could not be 
reconciled with the authoritarian nature of the Party. 
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It is critical to the argument to establish glasnost's impetus toward change in a nation 
where, for centuries, autocratic rule defined the political and socioeconomic structures. 
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the literature of such noted Soviet citizens as Andrei 
Sakharov and Aleksandr Sol2iienitsyn in order to comprehend how die lack of democratic 
freedoms, such as the right to freedom of speech and of the press, in the Soviet Union 
created a system totally antithetical to the social democracy platform Vladimir I. Lenin 
used to gain power in 1917. By evaluating the works of Russian authors, one can gain an 
understanding of the democratization process which was embodied in glasnost. 
hi Sakharov's volume, Memoirs, published in 1990, he reflects on the restrictions 
placed on himself^ his family, and friends as well as countless other political dissidents 
residing in the Soviet Union. As Sakharov explains, censorship, enforced by the KGB, or 
Committee of State Security, regarding communication and freedom of expression was 
always present in order to suppress social resistance and ensure political loyalty to the 
Communist Party. As Sakharov recounts, his struggle for human rights started earnestly 
in the mid-60's when he published a series of reform iiroposals meant to stimulate the 
economy and allow intellectual freedom. The defining difference between Sakharov's 
bid for social democratization and Gorbachev's glasnost reform is that each perceived the 
idea of open communication as fulfilling different objectives. While Gorbachev 
employed the term glasnost to enhance the Soviet system, not destroy it, Sakharov 
desired open commimication and die ability to inform and be informed as a fundamental 
right of humanity, regardless of the consequences to the Soviet system. 
As a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975 the distinguished scientist was exiled 
to Grorky with his wife, Elena Bonner by orders of the Chairman of the Presidium of the 
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Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev, in 1980.'* Sakharov presents a compelling 
perspective of the struggle of political dissidents who were silenced to benefit the 
Communist Party authority. Additionally, Sakharov exenq}lifies the Soviet citizen's 
desire to break fi-ee of political and social oppression, and to that end he illustrates the 
need for glasnost before Gorbachev advocated the reform. 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, literary writer and political activist, through his literature 
shed li^t on the reforms needed in the interest of democratization, hi his important 
pubUcation of 1991, Rebuilding Russia. Solzhenitsyn expands on the processes and 
problems that Russia must conJfront since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a Russian 
citizen he offers a candid evaluation of the mentality that has inhibited social 
democratization. Solzhenitsyn's insights also include tiie definition of democracy from 
the Russian perspective, a valuable contribution in comprehending what glasnost means 
to tile national population.^ 
An important part of the study in understanding glasnost's effects on the Soviet 
population and on the Communist Party is met by evaluating how glasnost was 
interpreted. It is interesting to note that, according to author W. Bruce Lincoln, tihe term 
glasnost was initially used by the "enhghtened bureaucrats" who occupied the courts of 
19'*' century Russia. What is imperative about Lincoln's account is that the Russian 
definition of glasnost was altogether different from how the West understood the term. 
According to Lincoln, flie term glasnost emerged to represent the necessary 
commimication "important in bridging the gap between the bureaucracy and educated 
 ̂Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York; Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1990). 
' Aleksandr Solzenitsyn, Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals (New York; Farrar, 
Strauss, and Giroux, Inc., 1991), 64. 
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society which Nicholas I's firai suppression of the Decembrists had opened at the 
beginning of his reign."® 
lincoln's assessment of glasnost lends a firm basis to the argument that Gk>rbachev 
used the term according to a particular understanding obtained firom Russian thinkers. In 
the mid-19''' century the Russian courts of Nicholas I and Alexander n were marked by 
the desire for change that swept across Europe during tiie Enlightenment Consequently, 
many scholars and intelligentsia advocated glasnost as a way to bring public opinion to 
the fore but only under tiie auspices of authority. ' From Lincoln's 1981 volume 
The Vanguard of Reform comes a valuable insight into the definition glasnost took in the 
19*'' century, allowing a basis of comparison witii Gorbachev's definition over one 
hundred years later. 
Most notable to the premise of the thesis is the accoimt of Scott Shane who published 
Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union in 1994. Shanes's work 
largely supports &e contention of the thesis, claiming that "[i]nfonnation slew the 
totalitarian giant."^ Shanes's account is compelling because he focuses on the common 
Soviet citizen, providing insight into how the public responded to the restrictions on 
information and communication by the Communist Party. From artists to publishers to 
political prisoners, Shane gives a wide perspective of how information and expression in 
the form of art, literature, education, and opinion enables the development of identity 
apart from the state. Additionally, Shane presents valuable comparisons of how the 
® W. Brace Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats 1825-1861 (DeKalb, 
Illinois: Northem Illinois University Press, 1982),107-
'Ibid. 
® Scott Shane, Dismantling Utopia: How Infonnation Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
Publisher, 1994), 6. 
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Communist Party responded to glasnost as the governing authority and felt challenged 
by the flow of potentially damaging information. By offsetting the viewpoints of society 
and those of the Party officials the reader gains an understanding of what was at stake for 
both society and the political entity. Moreover, Shane's focus enables the reader to 
realize the consequences involved when the struggle for political power leads to &e 
sacrifice of the society. 
In establishing the contrary objectives that Gorbachev recommended, when he first 
declared the use of glasnost as a reform, it is necessary to review his own literature for a 
iiiller comprehension of what he hoped to accomplish. Perhaps one of the most revealing 
accounts of the Commimist Party's illusion concerning social consensus comes from 
Gorbachev's first book in which he outlines the reform initiatives.' It is especially 
valuable in terms of establishing Gorbachev's loyalties to the Party and of his belief in 
the socialist democratic system that Lenin had implemented. The countless references to 
Leninist principles that Goihachev uses throughout Perestroika and speeches delivered 
during his time in ofiRce point to the unyielding direction in which Gorbachev wished to 
lead the Soviet Union. Yet, there is also an unmistakable difference in method found in 
the leadership of Gorbachev. 
Unlike his predecessors, who maintained a course that did not deviate from the Party 
line, Gorbachev exhibits a flexibility and receptivity to different approaches in the 
interest of motivating change in the nation. Hence, he proposed glasnost as a way to 
engage the population in a discussion of issues relevant to economics and politics. The 
new style approach, utilizing glasnost, was distinctive in that it offered public 
' Gorbachev, Perestroika. 
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participation. However, Gorbachev's platform for encouraging reform, "new thinking," 
is still packaged in the style of Party compliance, which presents a paradoxical situation 
in terms of glasnost's democratic value and the rigidity of the Party structure. To observe 
better the incompatibility of glasnost with the Party dogma it is reasonable to explore the 
writings of the man who embodied Party principles of socialist democracy yet sou^t to 
implement a democratic reform meant for social rejuvenation. 
One of the best sources of comparison comes from Gorbachev's autobiography of 
1995, Memoirs, in which he reflects on the course of action that he took and that 
ultimately led to the failure of the Communist Party to maintain power, driving flie Soviet 
Union to the collapse of 1991.^° In Memoirs, Gorbachev is acutely aware of the 
corruption in Party politics in all areas of the Soviet system: economic, political, and 
social, which due to a lack of progressiveness in reform, maintained the status quo of 
Party authority and kept the society debilitated. Most relevait to the argument of this 
thesis is Gorbachev's insight concerning his interpretation of glasnost. What he 
formulates in Perestroika. die a^erence to the Leninist socialist democratization as 
critical to the process of socioeconomic reform, takes on a different interpretation in 
Memoirs when Gorbachev has retrospectively assessed all the changes brought to bear 
upon his nation under his leadership. 
By his own admission, Gorbachev acknowledges the contradictions found in his 
speech that he delivered to the Congress, contradictions that he could afford to be more 
introspective about at a later date. Yet, these contradictions effectively demonstrate the 
Gorbachev, Memoirs. 
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tenuous nature of the Communist Party system regarding political and social interaction. 
Gorbachev writes: 
'Contradictions' of this kind can also easily be found in other places in my report 
It contains the theme generally recognized at that time, that 'by relying on the 
advantages of socialism, the country has in a short historical period reached the 
heists of historical and social progress.' But only two paragraphs later tiiere is a 
reference to 'the need for further changes and transformations, for the 
achievement of a new qualitative state of society.. .This means sweeping changes 
in the area of labour and the material and spiritual conditions of life. This means 
energizing the entire system of political and social institutions, a de^>ening of 
socialist democratic principles, and self-govemment for the people.' ' 
Gorbachev's words epitomized the contradictions wiiich he, as a leader, faced in 
attempting to reconcile the dysfunctional socioeconomic Soviet system with die authority 
of the Communist Party. Substantial change in the Soviet Union had been hampered by 
the inability of the Party to concede power in all three spheres of interest, politically, 
economically, and socially. Gorbachev was challenging the Party to be receptive to 
reform that would potentially affect the central political aufliority because he was 
appealing to society, in addition to tiie Party, to move the nation forward. According to 
JudiA Devhn, Party officials rejected the reforms outright based on a continuing 
commitment to the Marxist-Leninist ideology." Market economics, promoted by 
perestroika, were associated with capitalism, in direct opposition to the socialist ideology. 
Particular to glasnost, few Party members were supportive to the democratization reform, 
maintaining that "Leninist socialism was becoming increasingly discredited among the 
radical intelligentsia."" Most Party officials refused to condone any deviation from the 
" Ibid. 174. 
Judith Devlin, The Rise of the Russian Democrats: Hie Causes and Consequences of the Elite Revolution 
(Hants, England; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 1995). 
Ibid. 
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Marxist-Leninist dogma based on iwinciple. Realistically, Gorbachev's "anti-Marxist 
heresy" caused Soviet officials to reject any reform, economic or social that would 
challenge their position of power. As Peter A. Hauslohner notes, Groibachev faced a 
growing consensus within the Party apparatus tiiat resisted ''the democratization of 
government and the Party,"" therefore initiating political divisions. 
The struggle between Gorbachev and tiie controlling power of tiie Communist Party is 
effectively described in Dusko Doder and Louise Bnmson's book of 1990, Gorbachev: 
Heretic in the Kremlin. Particularly relevant to the argument of this thesis is how 
Gorbachev is illustrated as a reform-minded leader who still believes in the political 
premise of the Party as the vanguard of socialist democracy. However, according to 
Doder and Branson, "Gorbachev would not recognize publicly the magnitude of the 
contradiction between his quest for democratization and a Marxist-Leninist Party's 
rule,"^^ a characterization which captures the argument of the thesis. 
Essentially, the contradictions in the system and in the leadership of Gorbachev are 
important ui imderstanding why he initiated siich a reform as glasnost The reform that 
would bring democracy to the population in hopes that socialism would prevail proved to 
be an impossible mission. This thesis takes the position that glasnost was first, 
misinterpreted by Gorbachev because he was a product of his political culture and 
repres^ted what he beUeved to be the correct system of government in the Soviet Union. 
Ed A. Hewett and Victor H. Winston, ed.. Milestones in Glasnost and Perestrovka: Politics and People 
(Washington D.C., Brookings Institute. 1991), 47. 
Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Penguin Books, 
1990), 72. 
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Second, the critical point revolves around glasnost as intangible reform that escaped 
Gkn-bachev's carefully executed plans for renewal of the nation. Glasnost embodied 
much of what the Party deemed to be threatening to the political presence of power, 
ultimately leading to Party censorship and controls placed on the population, therefore 
limiting social liberties. In the interest of power, the Party was capable of maintaining 
the status quo throu^ communication controls, a position that was politically pragmatic 
for authoritarianism but vastly ineffective in terms of socioeconomic progress. What 
Gorbachev conceived in glasnost turned out to be counter-productive for the Party and 
for the survival of the Soviet Union. Yet, even if Gorbachev had never turned to glasnost 
the rest of the world continued progressing despite the Party's reluctance to implement 
change. 
Today tiie former Soviet Union is regarded as an unsuccessful political experiment. 
However, there is more at stake than a cursory evaluation of how not to conduct socialist 
democracy. The real value in studying the experience of the former Soviet nation is to 
gain a greater imderstanding of the interactions necessary between political power and the 
society they govern if real progress is to be achieved. Statistics show that the Soviet 
Union was a formidable military power and produced more industrial products such as 
steel than the United States, a commendable accomplishment if a nation's resources rest 
solely on militarization and the industrial output to secure militarization.^^ However, 
diere are also resources that must be nurtured if progress is to occur in a nation. 
Solzhenitsyn elaborates on the crisis of disequilibrium in the former Soviet Union; 
Following the bitter experience of 1917, when we plunged headlong into what we 
thought was democracy Vasili Maklakov, a prominent leader of the Constitutional 
Shane, Dismantling Utopia. 86. 
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Democrats, reminded us all of a simple truth by the following admission: "hi 
order to function, democracy needs a certain level of political discipline among 
the populace." But this is precisely what we lacked in 1917 and one fears that 
there is even less of it today.'' 
Precisely because the population in Russia and tiie former Soviet Union was deprived of 
participation by the political power &e threat of a social rebellion was always present. 
Russia has endured more thai one crisis within its nation's borders in the 20'*'century, 
and contributed to more than one international conflict. The instability of such a 
powerful nation remains a valid concern for the global community as well as for the 
population of Russia. 
Glasnost represents what Russia was lacking to achieve national cohesion. The 
writers, scientists, and leaders needed glasnost before 1985. For two centuries the 
Russian society asserted itself in various rebellions in an efifort to be heard. Yet tfie 
political autocracy jealously guarded its power instead of promoting the concerns for 
society. This thesis argues that, placing the political power above the needs of society in 
order to bring what one authority perceives as socioeconomic or political equality 
ultimately costs the nation in terms of progress, and will far exceed what can possibly be 
gained throu^ controlling political allegiance. 
The structure of the thesis reflects the conflict between political authoritarianism and 
social democratization, specifically the Communist Party and glasnost. An analysis of 
literature supporting the trend of Russian rulers and Soviet leaders to promote autocracy 
will provide a coimterpoint that, for two centuries, there have been a number of political 
dissidents in Russian history who wwe imsuccessful because the political power had the 
Solzhenitsyn, Rebuilding Russia. 65. 
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authority to eradicate any opposition that came from society. 
The second chapter establishes a historical foundation that supports the contention that 
Russia developed into an autocracy and such a political system refused any reforms that 
challenged the political authority. The chapter examines leaders who brou^t a degree of 
reform to Russia and the Soviet Union, such as Peter the Great and Nikita IChrushchev, 
but whose objectives were directed to bolster the autocratic power in the systems of 
government. 
The third chapter focuses on Gorbachev's role as Communist Party political 
administrator, analyzing why he reflected the inadequacies of the system in his book 
Perestroika. yet was unaware of the tremendous need for, and impact that social liberties, 
such as glasnost, would provide. Additionally, the thesis argument that the Party created 
the illusion of a socialist Utopia while practicing political authoritarianism is developed in 
chapter three. 
Qiapter four contrasts Andrei Sakharov's experience wifli Gorbachev's in order to 
illustrate the social injustices which created the need for glasnost, long before tiie reform 
was implemented. In addition, there will be an analysis of the struggle for freedom of 
commimication among Soviet citizens drawn from the work of Scott Shane, showcasing 
the effects of glasnost on the general public. This ch^ter also addresses the disparity 
between the Conmnmist Party and the Soviet society in terms of communication and 
political authority in order to illustrate how freedom of commimication can be an 
important factor in the survival of a political system. 
In the fifth chapter the effects of glasnost are illustrated through the content of 
information that circulated throu^out tiie Soviet Union. The chapter reviews the 
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diversity of information that erupted into society with glasnost, and virtually exploded 
the myths that had propped up Party politics for decades. Additionally, there is an 
analysis of Gforbachev's fall from power as a result of the imperfections revealed by 
glasnost against the Party and Leninist principles. 
The concluding chapter examines the structure of the Russian state and the Soviet 
Union as instrumental in producing an autocracy that refused to take a progressive social 
direction. In li^t of glasnost, the conclusion underscores the necessity for political 
systems to facilitate dialogue witii citizens and increase the advantage for progress. 
CHAPTER TWO 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 
The Legacy of Political Autocracy 
Nineteenth-century Russian history professor Konstantine Kavelin contends "[a]Il of 
Russian history is primarily the history of the state, political history." ^ Kavelin's "state 
school" theory emerges from the Westemizer perspective of Russia's history which 
identifies with the Western European development of nations. Alexaider Yanov 
evaluates Kavelin's "state school" theory in support of his own assertion that Russia 
became an autocratic empire with the reign of Ivan IV who effectively removed any 
limitations on the political power by subordinating the economic and social system to a 
function performed for the benefit of the state. ̂  
According to Yanov, the system of government tiiat grew out of Russia upon the 
expulsion of the Tatars amounted to a strange hybrid of despotism and absolutism 
because the economic power and the ideological power of society were arrested by the 
power of the Tsar. Yanov argues that tiie defining feature occurred under Tsar Ivan the 
Terrible when he implemented the Oprichnina, "the nucleus of autocracy which 
' Alexander Yanov, The Origins of Autocracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1981), 242-43. 
^Ibid. 
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determined.. .the entire subsequent historical process in Russia."^ Yanov describes 
the relevance of the Oprichnina to Russian political development: 
If Charles Montesquieu invented the separation of powers, then Ivan ttie Terrible 
invented the separation of functions between powers. The separation of powers 
leads, as history has shown, to democracy. ITie separation of fimctions leads to 
autocracy. This was the true political significance of the Oprichnina.. .a means 
for maximization of political control wi& a minimiim of administration.'' 
Yanov goes on to explain tiiat, due to tfie division of territoiy under Ivan IV, a social 
mentality of division in order to secure national power became the accepted standard of 
political and economic development. Yanov's theoiy emphasizes the use of terror, 
delivered by the Oprichniki, or the political police, under the Tsar's orders, which 
essentially demanded allegiance of the population to the political and economic stiucture. 
Under such a system no possible means of participation or competition could result 
because the source of power was removed from the population. 
Russian autocracy is described by Yanov in reference to Montesquieu's philosophy 
that suggests the separation of powers in Western Europe led to a monarchy with an 
aristocratic class while Russia never developed an aristocracy with independent economic 
power.' According to Montesquieu, the natural class structure which emerges from a 
monarchy produces a society that is self-interested, creating ambition in the interest of 
acquisition of wealth or status. The presence of competition inspires performances based 
upon honor, a characteristic Montesquieu claims acts as the cohesion of a competitive 
 ̂Ibid., 68. 
" Ibid., 69-
' Emile Durkheim, Montesquieu and Rosseau: Forerunners of Sociology (Michigan: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1983), 24-35. 
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society, but which he cautions "is possible only if men have a certain concern for 
dignity and freedom."^ 
Emile Durkheim's analysis examines the social classification theory put forth by 
Montesquieu in ^ effort to understand why societies differ in political order. 
A despotism is either a variety of monarchy in which all the orders have been 
abolished and there is no division of labor, or a democracy in which all the 
citizens except the ruler are equal, but equal in a state of servitude. Thus it has 
the aspect of a monster, in which only the head is alive, having absorbed aU the 
energies of the oiganism. The principle of such social life in such a society can 
be neither virtue, because the people do not participate in the affairs of the 
community, nor honor, because there are no differences of status. If men adhere 
to such a society, it is from passive submission to the prince's will, that is solely 
fiamfear? 
Durkheim's analysis supports Yanov's argument that Russia's unique autocratic empire 
was the result of an abolition of economic and social power, and the institution of an 
administrative order that consolidated the political authority. Yanov goes on to make 
another convincing point relevant to this thesis. The consolidation of power requires "the 
minimization of ideas . . .so that the thought of the possibility of challenging the constant 
plundering of the economy cannot even arise."* With the elimination of economic 
competition, the necessity of eliminating ideological participation is paramount if the 
state is to retain its dominance. 
Having established the trends of Western Europe to democratic behavior and of 
Russia to autocracy, it still remains to explain why Russia, despite such a dominant 
political structure was given to extremist politics throughout history. Precisely because 
there was a lack of organized competition in the system, Russian struggles with power 
®Ibid.,31. 
'' Ibid., 31-2. 
^Ibid., 39. 
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were marked by violence and strategic plotting in order to gain the upper hand. As 
Yanov reminds, Russian history exhibits a pattern of full-scale social and economic 
dominance exerted by the poUtical power of the era, followed by a period of revolution, 
reforms, or relaxation of tiie power. Yet, the aforementioned period is always temporary, 
overshadowed by the inheritance of being politically dominated and unable to rally a 
broader support for permanent change.^ Such tendencies can be explained by tiie term, 
'Reactionary politics," when the opposition to the old system is present but the impetus to 
effect progressive change is lacking. Challenging the authority of the system is one thing 
while challenging the system itself is quite another. 
According to Yanov, Russia demonstrates the disposition to reactionary politics 
primarily because the nation has become too dependent on one resource of power. This 
ailment is supported by tiie patrimonial identity which Russia and the Soviet Union 
embraced, particularly after the expulsion of the Tatars which forced the necessity to 
create a strong national image. As long as ttie identity of the authority was firmly woven 
into the national consciousness the possibility of success for reform was sUm. 
The mentality of defense was foremost in the objectives of both the rulers and of the 
people who had endured the Tatar pillaging of Russian lands, starting in 1242 and lasting 
for more than two centuries. Such an experience created the fortitude to erect a national 
defense structure that would secure the people. The terms for security, therefore, were of 
little importance at that time because tiie struggle for the Russians was to defend 
themselves, not to free themselves. Consequently, the &st Russian Tsar, Ivan HI, built a 
national power based on the idea of "collectivization" in order that the lands and the 
'Ibid. 
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population could be safe from the enemy. Hans Von Eckhardt argues that during the 
Muscovite era "the idea of the reason of the state began to germinate."^" Establishing an 
identity capable of consolidating the nation was also accomplished under the reigns of the 
first two Russian Tsars, Ivan HI and Ivan IV. Patrimony was introduced by the middle of 
tiie 16*''century, but the power of the patrimonial identification emerged with Peter the 
Great. 
Peter I took the first title, "Russian Enq)eror'' iq)on the Peace of Nystatdt in the fall of 
1721,^^ and began plans for the creation of a capital built exclusively for tiie defense of 
the state. Prior to the construction of St. Petersburg, Russian cities were built to defend 
only themselves. Peter's penchant for rationaUty and order can be seen in the straight 
lines of St. Petersburg's architecture. Under Peter I, mass militarization occurred 
primarily because the Tsar was involved in numerous conflicts, and also because he was 
driven to excel in forging a powerful military establishment. 
As a Tsar, Peter assumed the position of military commander, but the position 
influenced his reforms and political administration to be advantageous to the state power 
but disastrous to the population that were subjected to his command. With Peter's 
direction Russia saw reforms that enforced service to the state, excluding no one. 
According to Anisimov, "Peter had carefully jM-ovided that nobody 'got out' of service or 
the tax assessment or some form of occupation, a situation that consolidated the 
Hans Von Eckhardt, Ivan The Terrible (New York: Alfred A. Knop  ̂1949), 251. 
" Evgenii V. Anisrmov, The Reforms of Peter the Great: Progress through Coercion (New York; M.E. 
Sharpe, 1993), 34. 
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society under the power of the Tsar. Moreover, Anisimov makes Ihe case that the first 
Law Code of 1649 tied servants to their masters during the lifetime of the master but set 
the legal standard of slavery to be selected fi-om the "free and itinerant" population. The 
idea of "free people" was removed entirely under Peter's reforms, and the term came to 
be associated with the fugitives of society. These fijgitives, primarily indentured 
servants or peasants, were turned in by citizens or apprehended by the state police in an 
attempt to control social order. The insistence of Peter to regulate the population under 
reforms, such as the "soul tax," imposed upon the agrarian sector to fund the state, and 
the military established "Table of Ranks" that enforced service regardless of place in 
society, created a significant influence on Russian development. Additionally, the Tsar 
reinforced the notion of patrimonial dictatorship, resorting literally to beating those under 
his command to induce conformity to his system. Peter's intent was to produce a strictly 
regimented society, a goal which he initiated but did not realize during his lifetime. 
However, tfie Petrine notion of order produced a state system that deflected challenge and 
a mentality that compliance was the best course of action if one wanted to avoid 
pimishment. 
Even as Russia yielded to the primary objective of militarization, the Tsar had 
introduced European culture and customs to his nation which diOused tiie idea of St. 
Petersburg solely as a fortress. Particularly, by the time Catherine Ihe Great (1762-96) 
completed her bid for power in 1762, Russia was indeed responding to the Enlightenment 
ideas from Europe. '̂* The Empress was instrumental in promoting cultural thought 
" Ibid. 
Isabel de Madariaga, Rxissia in the Age of Catherine the Great (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1981). 
21 
among the Russian bureaucrats, indulging her own taste for theatre productions by 
writing plays and engaging the French philosophes, Voltaire and Diderot, in her courts. 
Catherine's reign saw the legislation of printing presses throughout Russia, with the 
provision that police were to be notified as to content of the publications. In 1794 the 
Academy of Arts was founded in St. Petersburg, contributing to cultural development for 
elite classes. Additionally, Catherine authorized scholars to travel to Europe and pursue 
education at foreign institutions. Yet, as de Madariaga contends, Ihe 1790's represent 
the parting of the ways between the government and the intellectuals of Russia .. .flie 
intelligentsia."" Such divisions in Russian society marked the defining point when 
philosophies and trends of thought emerged fi'om the educated population only to be 
crushed by the political authority. 
According to de Madariaga, the split between flie state and the intelligentsia occurred 
for several reasons, but most notably as a result of the Empress's growing intolerance of 
radical thinking and a cultural diQiision found in society that had not existed before 
educational facilities were founded. Arguably, the French Revolution of 1789 was the 
most influential event for Catiierine, alerting the Empress to the possibility of 
insxirrection and rebeUion in Russia. The once powerful European monarchy came imder 
challenge by a rising opposition. Therefore, Catherine began a regressive poUcy 
concerning the censorship of publications, hoping to avoid a similar fate in her own 
empire. 
The plight of opposition to the Russian monarchy began with Alexander Radishchev 
who was educated in Leipzig and worked in the Senate and the military. When he 
Ibid., 547-
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published A Joumev from St. Petersburg to Moscow in 1790, an account of the 
oppressive conditions that consiuned nearly the entire population of Russia, Radishchev 
was arrested and, althou^ originally sentenced to execution, was ultimately exiled. 
Catherine resented Radishchev's claims that autocratic rule should be challenged by the 
moral authority of society. Under such conditions the Tsarina refused to tolerate 
dissension from the established order, a position that was beneficial for the ruler but not 
for the ruled. Denying the privilege of communication throu^ publication led to a 
breakdown between Catiierine and her subjects, a trend that developed the revolutionary 
attitudes of tiie next century. 
The increasing dictatorial position of the Tsarist regime, with regard to 
communication, initiated a social behavior that failed to mature to a productive and 
respected force, but instead languished in fits and starts of revolutionary fervor which 
resulted in fiirflier social dysfunction. Radishchev describes the situation in Journey: 
Censorship has become the nursemaid of reason, wit, and imagination, of 
everything great and enli^tened. But where there are nurses, there are babies 
and leading strings, which often lead to deformed legs; where there are guardians, 
there are minors and immature minds unable to take care of themselves. If there 
are always to be nurses and guardians, then the child will walk with leading 
strings for a long time and will grow up to be a cripple... Everywhere these are 
the consequences of the usual censorship, and the sterner it is, tfie more disastrous 
are its consequences.^® 
Jesse V. Clardy evaluates Radishchev's position as one which urges freedom of thought 
and the right to expression. Without such fundamental truths the society will learn 
nothing more than concession to authority, and the authority will only become less 
receptive to the formation of different trends of thought and expression in the interest of 
Aleaxander Radishchev, A Joumev From St Petersburg to Moscow (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1958), 165. 
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guarding its power. De Madariaga's analysis of Catherine's reign emphasizes her 
reluctance to allow the nobility political discussion even though the nobles were liberated 
far more under Catherine than imder any of her predecessors.'̂  The effects of forei^ 
revolt no doubt played an influential role in prohibiting progressive communication 
among society, but the atrocities committed by the revolutionary opposition in France 
contributed to Russia's desire to distance itself from European affairs. 
The emergence of the Russian intelligentsia during the reign of Catherine the Great 
created tension in the autocracy, demonstrated throu^out the 19^ century until the final 
rule of Nicholas n (1892-1917). The fluctuating policies that allowed for a minimum of 
political interaction only fueled shaiper criticism among the service gentty, the new 
classification of citizens who possessed nobility heritage. According to Andrzej WaUcki, 
the liberalization of the gentiy class gathered momentum, particularly during the reign of 
Alexander n (1855-81), which witnessed growing dissension from the political power in 
tiie form of oiganizations of opposition. In order to build a consensus of thought among 
the radical opposition, a growing segment of the intelligentsia promoted ideas by 
publishing articles expounding on social change designed to promote balanced 
government and facilitate modernization. As Walicki stresses, the years following the 
reign of Nicholas I (1825-55) produced "high-minded optimism and national harmony" 
but culminated in the enforcement of political allegiance following the assassination of 
Alexander n in 1881. 
Nicholas Chemyshevsky, one of the sixties radicals, authored during his incarceration 
What Is To Be Done? in which he expands on his philosophy concerning necessity and 
" Isabel De Madariaga, Catherine the Great: A Short History (London: New Haven Press, 1990). 
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the historical evolution of life. Walicki notes that Chemyshevsky's chief observation 
was "the greatest evil in Russia was autocracy—which because of censorship he was 
obliged to refer to as 'bureaucracy.Despite Chemyshevsky's imprisonment, his book 
escaped pubhcation censorship and received popular acclaim fliroughout Russia, 
becoming one of the literary inspirations of Vladimir Dyich LeniiL '̂ However, while the 
impetus for social progress required intellect and ideas put into words, in Russia the force 
for change was weak. 
W. Bruce Lincoln argues that, precisely at tiie time enlightened thinking came to 
Russia by the middle of the 19'*' century, the number of people able to participate in a 
discussion concerning reform was minute. The percentage of gentry stood in small 
contrast to the majority of peasants, and there existed no poUtical body to interact with 
the autocracy on behalf of society. The lack of distributive power both in economics and 
intellectual education allowed neither for reform nor modernization because those who 
participated did so according to a single standard of power. Lincoln explains the 
situation: 
Russia lacked any national consultative or legislative body, for such was 
inconsistent with the premises upon which autocracy.. .had been based. At the 
same time rigid censorship meant that public commentary about her pressing 
problems remained impossible.... A course flius had to be found that would 
preserve autocracy and its traditional instruments but, at the same time, allow 
Rvissia to reenter the competition with Europe. . .Russia's economy—especially 
her industry—^must develop as had that of Europe and her social order must be 
adjusted to meet the needs that reasonably stemmed from that course of action.^" 
Andizej Walicki, A Histoiv of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Mandsm (Stanford, 
California; Stanford University Press, 1979), 201. 
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The bureaucratic administration and society required participation in the reform 
process, yet Alexander n was as jealous of power as all of his predecessors had been and 
granted fractional liberty. The complexities of economic and social development 
demanded distribution of power, not only in administration but intellectually. 
Li 1861 the Tsar abolished serfdom in Russia in response to growing sentiment among 
flie intelligentsia for emancipation. Emancipation of the serfs revolved around economic 
issues which became increasingly worrisome to national stability. Nineteenth-century 
Europe had moved toward uibanizaticm and industrialized economies, but Russia's 
agrarian population remained mired under legislation that prohibited mobility. Alexander 
n's emancipation refoitns were burdened by his determination to preserve the status quo 
in the political and social arenas. While serfdom formally ended, the continuing 
autocratic government was not conducive to progressive action economically or socially. 
Lincoln contends that Alexander n reacted to European expressions of power, ideological 
and economic, as a threat to the national identity of Russia as epitomized in the words of 
S.S. Uvarov: "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality."^^ However, there were terms 
such as glasnost tiiat began to circulate among the Russian enlightened circles. 
According to Lincoln, the term glasnost was coined in the middle of the 19^ century 
to define the bridge between the public and the government Specifically glasnost 
referred to information that went public and was used in conjunction with the term 
zakonnost, or lawfulness. As Lincoln points out, the imderstanding in Russia of public 
information and lawfulness amoimts to a narrow definition that suggests the public must 
comply with the government when dispensing information through dialogue or in 
Ibid. 
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literature or other modes of expressi(»L Ultimately the notion of glasnost was to 
involve the society but only insofar as that involvement did not contradict the dictates of 
the law. Such a twist on participation is especially difficult for Western ideologists to 
comprehend, and in fact Lincoln e;q)lains that die enlightened Russian bureaucrats 
struggled to reconcile the standard of law with autocratic power and to understand the 
purpose of glasnost. Lincoln's analysis of the meaning given to glasnost is si^orted by 
censor V.A. Tsie who wrote in 1856: 
It is necessary to note that, with the expansion of [administrative] authority [on 
tiie local level], it is essential to resort to a single device, namely glasnost', in 
order to retain it within lawful limits. This is the most reliable, one can say the 
the only, means for ensuring that the beneficial plans of the central government 
will not become a dead letter but will become fully beneficial in their 
consequences. .. .Nowhere does glasnost' have such a fundamental and 
undoubted utility as in legal proceedings.. .It provides the oppressed the 
opportunity to enjoy the protection of the law, and it alone, with its all-shattering 
power, can shake and finally eradicate the most shameful ulcer of our country— 
corruption. 
Many enlightened members of the Russian bureaucracy saw the promise of glasnost, 
including Prince Petr Dolgorukov, described by Lincoln as "a controversial and 
tempestuous figure during the first years of Alexander U's reign,"^^ and Alexander 
Herzen who was also a supporter of reformist efforts, hi 1860, O.A. Przhetslavskii of the 
Censorship Administration wrote On Glasnost'in Russian Journalistic Literature which 
defined the term glasnost as contraiy to the designs of Russian politics. According to 
Przehetslavskii, glasnost "does not conform to our civic order, the peculiarities of our 
national character, the level of our present development, or our future requirements."^ 
Ibid., 184. 
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The definition became Russia's standard of understanding glasnost, meaning 
essentially that public opinion should conform to political authority. 
Because glasnost was inextricably linked with the premise that lawfulness equated 
autocratic govenunent, there was little motivation to pursue alternative defuoitions which 
mi^t reach dijBFerent outcomes. The single-mindedness of principle in glasnost's 
definition was imique to the Russian perception and, as such, presented few controversial 
perspectives among the inteUigentsia. Unity of thou^t and piupose was the 
underpinning of the Russian government, established and maintained through resolute 
acceptance of the autocratic order. Entertaining different approaches to the estabUshed 
law could only be achieved in Russia by radical dissent because there existed no legal 
means of challenging the authority. 
The Revolution and Perfection of Autocratic Rule 
The prelude to the Bolshevik Revolution began with careful thou^t and preparation 
on the part of Vladimir I. Ulyanov, later known as Lenin. In addition to the revolutionaiy 
direction supplied by Lenin other factors contributing to the Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917 were a Tsarist ruler with no progressive intentions, a fhistrated intelligentsia that 
rallied together, and a massive population that was overshadowed by the Bolshevik's new 
leadership objectives. In point of fact the most instrumental factor contributing to the 
collapse of the Tsarist regime was leadership because under Lenin, the Bolshevik Party 
siqjplied a viable opposition to conduct the revolution. 
However, in reviewing the outcome of the Russian Revolution history presents a grim 
picture of dictatorship that repressed and tortured the very citizens it claimed to defend. 
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The established Union of Soviet Socialist Republics evolved to become an 
industrialized nation led by a militarized regime. The Soviet population of workers fell 
into one of two categories, either as an industrial or agricultural worker, or as a member 
of the militaiy whose job it was to defend the state interests. What is most interesting 
about such an arrangement is who exactly was defending the interests of the workers? 
According to Gorbachev's interpretation, the worker population became the "state 
enemy" if they disagreed with socioeconomic or pohtical policies. Therefore the concept 
of the "enemies of the people" literally translated into tiie society being against the state, 
a consequence that rendered the peculation helpless to challenge state authority. 
The most infamous of the Party's repressors, Joseph Stahn, succeeded in the Soviet 
industrialization. He was also pubUcly denounced and ostracized by Nikita Khrushchev 
in 1956 at the de-Stalinization speech, an event which triggered the process known as the 
"Thaw" in the post-Stalin years. Stalinization left deeper scars in the Soviet society and 
made a far larger impact on Soviet identity and progress than any of the effects of 
industrialization. Former General of the Commimist Party, Dmitri Volkogonov, 
summarizes Stalin's contribution to the Soviet Union as blatant "lawlessness and 
totalitarianism" and characterizes Stalin as a man with no conscience. 
Khrushchev's bold condemnation of Stalin broke through important social barriers in 
the Soviet Union, allowing for the emergence of critical thinking, even if at a very 
superficial level. The documentation Khrushchev had obtained from P. N. Pospelov, 
editor of Pravda, pointed to fabrication and injiistice committed by Party officials against 
other Party ofiQcials, rank and file members, as well as millions of Soviet citizens. The 
E>mitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Trimph and Tragedy (New York; Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 580. 
29 
release of information proved to be as damaging to &e Soviet identity as to the leader 
who committed crimes against his own citizenry. Khrushchev responded by beginning 
the massive military build-up against alleged American imperialism, hoping that 
competition on an international scale would boost Soviet morale and redefine national 
purpose. Volkogonov credits Khrushchev with inadvertently beginning "new thinking" 
even though his leadership was short-lived due to the inability of the Party to comprehend 
the seriousness of Stalin's legacy. 
However, there is a legacy that beccnnes far more influential than Stalinism. Lenin, as 
the front-runner of the intelligentsia responsible for organizing opposition politics in 
Russia, created the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Harold Shukman, the editor of 
Volkogonov's latest publication which deals exclusively with Lenin, describes the 
founder of the Soviet Union as follows: 
From its inception to its end the Soviet state was identified wilh Lenin, whether 
alive or dead. Without him, it is generally accepted, there would have been no 
October revolution. . .He was made into an icon, a totem of ideological purity and 
guidance beyond questioning.^® 
Shukman goes on to e^qilain that Lenin "remained untouched" after Stalin was implicated 
in Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress. What was it about Lenin's 
rtQ'stique which held generation after generation captive to the socialist ideal for over 
seven decades? Volkogonov argues that it was Lenin who created tiie Conmiunist Party 
with all of its notorious injustices, injustices which have been assigned to Stalin as die 
monster dictator of the regime. The argument has gained popular recognition only since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dethroning of the Party in 1991. Still, the 
Dmitri Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biogaphv (New York: The Free Press, 1994), xxiii. 
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question remains one of the peculiar enigmas liiat trouble Soviet and Western scholars 
about Russian history and politics. 
Volkogonov's conclusions are that Leninism virtually castrated the Russian nation by 
wresting any hope of democratic socialism from the Provisional Giovemment of the 1917 
February revolution. Perhaps Lenin's socialist vision suffered because of the crippled 
socioeconomic conditions already present under the Tsarist system, however the 
transition proved to be inadequate as a socialist democracy. Before the Bolshevik Party 
had been oiganized, Lenin began his education from the intelligentsia of the 19^ centmy 
courts. Nicholas Chemyshevsky challenged liberalism to be inadequate in progressive 
change when applied to the economic and historical development of nations. 
Chemyshevsky advocated measures and is described by Nikolai Valentinov as "the 
generally acknowledged leader of tiie Russian revolutionary current. Ascribed to 
Chemyshevsky is Lenin's rejection of the liberal perspective primarily because liberalism 
advocated Westem political procedure. Consequently, Lenin's position led to his 
embrace of revolutionary politics in pursuit of Populism which emerged in the mid-
1800's as an ideology promoting societal involvement. However, the intelligentsia 
literature was not the only influence on Lenin. According to the popular mythology 
about Lenin, the execution of his brother Alexander in 1887 as a result of the planned 
assassination on Alexander m fueled the determinism in Lenin to continue in the 
footsteps of the revolutionary, and overthrow the Tsarist government. 
" Nikolai Valentinov, The Early Years of Lenin (Ann Arbor, Michigan; The University of Michigan Press, 
1969), 231. 
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In Russia, terrorism was acknowledged to be the only possible challenge to a 
centuries old autocracy that ^eatened to drag on for eternity. For Lenin revolution was 
both ends and means. Valentinov comments that, although Alexander Ulyanov and his 
yoimger brother Vladinfiir were both revolutionaries, the di£ference between them was a 
question of morality. It is difficult to evaluate the perspectives held by Alexander 
because of his execution at the age of 21 years, but Valentinov suggests that Lenin's elder 
brother retained an idealistic faith in humanity and that Lenin had not the disposition or 
the faith of his brother, instead relying on more aggressive actions. 
Revolution in Europe had redefined governments. Lenin was influenced by the French 
revolution which had happened a fiiU century earlier but which left deep impressions as 
to the power capable in revolution. Although Lenin immersed himself in literature from 
Marx and Chemyshevsky, he developed his own personal ideals of political objectives 
and how to achieve them. The Leninist ideology subscribed to one definition of morality: 
" 'Whatever serves Communism is moral.For Lenin the goal of securing political 
power in Russia involved revolutionary metiiods, as outlined by Chemyshevsky and 
suggested by Marx. However, according to Volkogonov, Lenin completely disregarded 
the e^lier hiunanist writings of Marx, preferring to resort to any means to one end. 
Volkogonov describes Lenin's intentions in this way: 
After his return to Russia on 16 April 1917, when he was whipping iq) a mood of 
frenzy, harnessing ^e masses' impatience, promising peace and land in exchange 
for support for his Party, Lenin bent every effort to turn that Party into a combat 
organization, capable of seizing power. . .This had nothing to do with socialism. 
The society which Lenin and his adherents began to build had to resort to 
tuirestrained violence, in accordance with the leader's views, in order to survive. 
As the highest principle of revolutionary development, the dictatorship trampled 
and subordinated everything to its own will. Having once espoused the idea of 
Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography 28. 
32 
socialism in one countiy, Lenin pushed questions of morality well down the 
Bolshevik agenda. 
The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 was led by the radical revolutionary Lenin, 
who saw revolution in Russia as a struggle for political power, nationally and 
internationally. Ultimately the needs of the society were not only compromised but 
violated. 
An example is found in Volkogonov's research which includes an authorization by tiie 
Party in 1919 to liquidate jewelry valued at millions of rubles in order to fimd the 
Comintern, the Commimist Party's international branch for advancing communism. In 
1921 the Party refused to allow the improvement of children's rations in the Soviet 
Union. As Volkogonov comments, "difiRculties faced by the regime do not justify the 
refusal to meet this need. While millions were cfying of hunger and disease, the Politi>uro 
was lavishly disbursing tsarist gold to ignite revolution in other countries,"'® Such events 
illustrate the priorities that Leninist principles held which are contradictory to socialist 
democracy. Revolution for the cause imited Leninist followers in a strange assembly 
known as the Communist Party. Lenin created the Party, but what did the Party hope to 
accompUsh other than a continuous revolution? To wliat ends were Party members 
devoted? As Volkogonov asks, "How can the dictatorship of one class—or more 
accurately one Party—be reconciled with the principles of people's power, liberty and tiie 
equaUty of all citizens?"'̂  According to Volkogonov, the answer revolves aroimd the 
^ Ibid., 69 
'"Ibid. 
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convoluted principles of Leninism that overthrew the Tsarist regime to implement a 
new regime, the Communist Party. 
Lenin established the Party to be the epicenter of the Soviet Union, unconditionally 
and without accountability. The socialist revolution became the mantra of Leninist 
ideals, but the rhetoric disguised the violence that accomp<uued Lenin's Bolshevik Party 
to power. The Bolsheviks embraced violence in tiie interest of power. Volkogonov 
describes the opposition faction called the Mensheviks as "the only true social 
democrats."^^ Socialist democracy was aUen to the formation of the Commimist Party 
primarily because Lenin declared himself a communist inl914, a position that technically 
divorced Lenin and the Communist Party from aSiliation with the German Social 
Democrats who approved of WWL Additionally, Lenin's earlier theory concerning 
social democracy failed to take effect once the Bolsheviks gained political power. By the 
Seventh Congress of 1918 flie Party officially took the title Communist Party of Russia.^^ 
The transition of power from the Tsarist Russia to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics became a reality in Lenin's lifetime. Still, the reality was not the benevolent 
socioeconomic system tiiat Marx had discussed. 
Revolution had won Lenin the poUtical authority he desired and fought for throu^out 
his lifetime. Yet, the Communist Party failed to implement socialism or socialist 
democracy because to do so would threaten the supremacy of the Party's political power. 
The maintenance of the Party in a position of command meant the denial of liberty to 
^ Ibid., 78. 
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society. The survival of the Party required total submission, without representation, 
without elections, without question. 
The Party never installed socialist or democratic institutions but instead inqilemented 
its own unique institutions capable of maintaining political power and social control 
Lenin had come to power throu^ revolutionary methods, and he knew that such avenues 
were open to anyone who opposed Party rule. Lenin's genius was reserved to eliminating 
the same options for revolt as he had selected. The first consequence was a massive 
restriction placed on society that was enf(»x:ed through militia power. The Cheka, or 
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage, institution 
guaranteed allegiance to the Party. Founded in December 1917, the Cheka became the 
secret political police, not unlike Ivan IV's Oprichnina, that was enqjowered by the use of 
terror against the Soviet population, one of Lenin's favorite methods of rule. 
Another institution founded by Lenin was the GULAG prison camps that performed 
mass executions and abuses against political prisoners smd dissidents of the revolution. 
The revolution was fueled by the forced imprisonment and labor of Soviet citizens at the 
insistence of Cheka force. With the Cheka and the GULAGs in place Lenin coiild assure 
the fiature course of Soviet power and the dominance of the Communist Party as the only 
vanguard of the system. Lenin oi^anized terror in the formation of the Communist Party 
in the single interest of political power. 
Leninism embodied the socialist revolution in name only. The reality for Soviet 
society was that the political power remained firmly in place over the economic needs or 
social issues of the peasant workers and proletariat masses. The irony of such a situation 
is that the socialist revolution became synonymous with Leninism as if he were the 
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creator of some benevolent Utopian ideal in his name. Leninism was never socialist 
democracy. However, Leninism was capable of masking reality with untruths, coercion, 
repression, and fear because for over seven decades the Communist Party held political 
power in Lenin's legacy of socialist revolution. 
For men like Stalin, Khrushchev, Bre2imev, Andropov, and Gort>achev, Leninism 
came in place of the national identity. Such a concept allowed institutions like the Cheka 
to evolve into the KGB, or the Committee for State Security, with the sole purpose of 
keeping the Communist Party in power. The most damaging aspect of all was the lack of 
social participation in a government that sustained itself on the riietoric of the socialist 
democratic ideology, consequently leading to hypocrisy. What Lenin created in the 
militarized Soviet state his successors were left to maintain in any way they could. Over 
the course of five decades, Stalin expanded the terrorist approach, Brezhnev ti^tened tiie 
bureaucratic rule, and Khrushchev's ambiguous appeals for reform cost him his 
leadership position. Andropov resorted to the usual reactionary politics that would 
consolidate Party power and keep the population disempowered, exactly as Leninism had 
initially done. 
The order of the Parly continued to be the paramount objective by the time Gorbachev 
ascended the ranks to become the seventh Soviet leader in March of 1985. Yet the Party 
only had power within the borders of the Soviet Union. Lenin's socialist revolution had 
not replaced capitalism or democracy, but instead created a bipolar existence in which the 
Soviet system was rapidly loosing ground to the United States in a battle of military 
might. More importantly, the Soviets were waging revolution against the democratic 
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capitalism of the West, but the Leninist legacy failed to realize the socialist democracy 
that it had espoused. Volkogonov explains: 
The leadership could not accept that Soviet society was not merely mired in 
stagnation, but also in a state of psychological disaffection and doubt about values 
that had previously been universally accepted. The gap between what people said 
in public and what they thoi^t was widening to the extent that it had become an 
everyday fact of life. The public mood was like Lenin's physical condition after 
10 March 1923. Leninism seemed on the surface to be alive, but it was incapable 
of a single fresh idea.. .The Russian people had not yet understood that Leninism 
was not amenable to reform, that cither it must remain what it had been for 
decades, or be totally discarded.^ 
As Volkogonov argues, w^t evolved under Lenin's dictates was a political direction 
completely antithetical to socialist democracy. Leninism developed as a result of the 
Bolshevik revolution mentality that thrived on Lenin, constant revolution against a 
constant enemy, both external and internal; by 1985 it was becoming increasingly harder 
to maintain this idea in the status of the prevailing mentality. 
^ Ibid, 476. 
CHAPTER THREE 
CLASH OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES 
Gorbachev as Communist Parly Leader 
The most interesting point which Volkogonov makes emphasizes the precarious 
position tiiat Gorbachev inherited. Leninism was the Soviet national ideological identity 
that had never been evaluated or challenged by the Party because Leninism, like the 
Party, had to remain in a position of imdisputed power. When Gorbachev came into 
power as the General Secretary he was a Party o£Eicial and devoted to the Leninist 
ideology. 
However, as General Secretary, Gorbachev reaUzed he had much to consider. The 
Soviet Union was failing to compete at an international level in terms of economic and 
technological development. Additionally, the Cold War was dragging out into its fourth 
decade, sapping the military expenditures of both the U.S. and tiie U.S.S.R., but 
particularly taxing the Soviet system. Initially, Gorbachev interpreted the lag in Soviet 
economics as due to production inefficiencies in the system, a viewpoint en^)hasized by 
Dusko Doder and Louise BransoiL According to Doder and Branson's analysis, the 
Soviet system was no longer efficient, prompting Gorbachev to implement the reform of 
perestroika as a restructuring of the system. 
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The importance of Gorbachev's intentions to restructure a system that was, as 
Volkogonov asserts, incapable of being restructured is paramount. The primary 
contradiction rests in the fact that Gorbachev was absolutely in line with the Marxist-
Leninist ideals. As a young Soviet citizen Gorbachev lived in the collectivized 
agricultural regions of Stavropol krai, or territoiy, farming with generations of his family. 
Perfiaps because of Gorbachev's early association with the land and family he developed 
an appreciation of the role of the Party in collectivized economics. The idea that 
advantage could be secured if one were of strong constitution and pledged allegiance to 
the Party was an indelible lesson to the peasant-worker populations that grew out of rural 
territories such as Stavropol Although Gorbachev had the experience of fanning as a 
young man, it was academics at which he would excel. 
In 1955 Gorbachev graduated with a degree in law from the Moscow State University 
where he was awarded the highest grade for writing a paper on "the demonstration of the 
advantages of socialist democracy over bourgeois democracy."' After graduation 
Gorbachev returned to Stavropol where he was appointed as an official at the Komsomol, 
or Communist Youth League. Gorbachev proceeded to advance throu^ the ranks of the 
Party, becoming second, then first secretary of the Stavropol province by 1970. As 
Gorbachev received recognition and status in the nomenklatura, he succeeded in making 
important governmental contacts, a necessity for Party members who desired to become 
officials. At the same time Gorbachev was forging his political presence as a committed 
and responsive administrator, the "Thaw" of the Khrushchev era was in progress. In 
response to the torment and tyranny that had characterized Stalin's Soviet leadership, 
' Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 44. 
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Khrushchev delivered his de-Stalinization speech to the XXth Party Congress in 1956. 
Attending his first Party Congress in the autumn of 1961, Gorbachev witnessed the 
detiironing of Stalin's "personality cult" that literally removed statues and relocated 
Stalin's gravesite at the Kremlin walL 
According to Gorbachev's reflections on the "Thaw" and de-Stalinization campaign, 
the crux of the problem existed in the Party apparatus, and not solely as a result of the 
unsavory character of one Soviet leader. However, during the events of Ae early sixties, 
Gorbachev raUied to the Party effort to minimize Stalin's legacy of teriOT because he was 
as invested in Party politics as any of his comrades. The strategy to ensure survival 
existed in eveiy strata of life throughout the Soviet Union, but nowhere did it thrive as 
strongly than in the Communist Party. 
Gorbachev's affiliation in the Party connected him to Yuri Andropov, also from flie 
Stavropol region and the head of the KGB from 1967 to 1982. In such capacity 
Andropov engaged in subversive crackdowns against political dissidents and participated 
in the corruption of power involving the Party apparatus. In their account of Andropov's 
role in the Party and the KGB, Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova suggest that 
Andropov engaged in conspiratorial actions in order to raise Russian nationaUsm, largely 
in response to the ineffective Brezhnev's propaganda. Solovyov and Klepikova describe 
Brezhnev's eighteai years in power as follows: 
He exhausted the country—^perhaps irreversibly. He brought agriculture, which 
was already unprofitable, to the point of final collapse; he made the national 
economy dependent upon foreign investments; he weakened the reins of 
government within the country; he loosened the bonds of Eastern Europe; 
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he retreated before America in such a key area as the Mddle East; and he 
reduced the Soviet Union to the role of a second rate power.^ 
Andropov's succession to Bre^mev occurred, according to Solovyov and Klepikova, as a 
resuh of long-established patterns of opportunism acquired from his years in the KGB 
and due to the lack of progressive vision. Once Andropov took o£5ce in the Kremlin his 
objectives were to "return to Stalinist-type labor legislation,"^ an iq)proach involving 
criminal indictment followed by discipline procedures. 
It is important to establish Andropov's position in the Party to illustrate the influence 
he had on Gorbachev. Andropov's education was minor, comparatively on the same 
level as Stalin's, while Gorbachev was academically accomplished. Consequently, 
Andropov's reaction to the situation inherited from Brezhnev was to turn away from 
ideology and tighten the police state in order to motivate economics. At the time 
Solovyov and Klepikova published their volume on Andropov in 1983, Gorbachev 
remained one of the "new class" Party officials, as many of his colleagues who came 
from outlying provinces and were consequently imtainted by Moscow politics. 
However, Gorbachev's evaluation of the state of the Soviet system mirrors closely 
Andropov's. According to Solovyov and Klepikova, Andropov's concept of crime 
ranged from "alcoholism, petty hooliganism, parasitism, absenteeism, the theft of 
govermnent property, bribery, nepotism, corruption," * and political dissent. Upon taking 
office in 1985, Gorbachev attributed the sluggish economic situation in the nation to the 
same social ills as Andropov established. Unlike Andropov, Gorbachev rejected the 
^ Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, Yuri Andropov (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1983), 277. 
^Ibid., 281. 
" Ibid., 283. 
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approach of increased coercion and discipline to force compliance to the system, as 
evidenced by his speech dehvered at the seventieth anniversaiy celebration of the 
October Revolution in 1987. 
The speech illustrates Gorbachev's decision to increase ideological awareness in tiie 
Soviet Union, specifically the Leninist ideal that created the Soviet nation. It is important 
to note that, throughout his speech, Gorbachev did not refer to tiie national ideology as 
communist, but Leninist Such a distinction is critical to understanding Gorbachev's 
position in the Party. Gorbachev's decision to use Leninism as the preferred course of 
thought and practice in the nation demonstrates his departure from Andropov's ^)proach. 
Moreover, for Grorbachev, Leninism embodied the spirit of the Soviet Union. Doder and 
Branson describe Gorbachev as a dedicated Marxist-Leninist, committed to the political 
structure of a one Party system and to socialism as the answer for socioeconomic 
advantage. Indeed, in his speech and in his volume Perestroika. piiblished two years after 
he became General Secretary of the CPSU, Gorbachev does speak with conviction aboiit 
the Leninist ideal and socialist democracy. 
Particularly in Perestroika. Gorbachev presents himself as a man with a vision, in 
much the same way Lenin did in his publications before the Bolshevik revolution. 
Although it cannot be asserted that Gorbachev was appealing to the nation by invoking 
Leninism, the rallying message certainly is primary throughout the book. One particular 
section is entitled "Perestroika is a Revolution" which comments: 
I think we had every reason to declare at the Januaiy 1987 Plenary Meeting: in its 
essence, in its Bolshevik daring and in its humane social thrust the present course 
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is a direct sequel to the great accomplishments started by the Leninist Party in 
tiie October days of 1917.^ 
Although Gorbachev declines to equate perestroika with the October revolution, his 
intention to link Leninism with perestroika as a revolutionaiy process is undeniable. 
Volkogonov comments that Gorbachev "declared with conviction that 'a bridge must be 
thrown from Lenin, connecting Lenin's ideas and Lenin's approach to the events of his 
time to the affairs of today '"® Conceivably Gorbachev's Leninist approach to refonn 
allowed him to demonstrate his loyalty to die Party while appealing to the masses to build 
socialism in the revolutionary manner of 1917. 
In addition, Gorbachev's return to the Leninist ideal allowed him to connect 
perestroika wifli the New Economic Policy that was begun xmder Lenin in March of 
1921. Perestroika was characterized by Gtjrbachev as a restructuring of the economics of 
the Soviet Union. As did many of his predecessors, Gorbachev showcased economic 
restructuring as reform for the nation. Beginning with NEP, the Soviets began a cycle of 
economic reform that would allow the Party to appear in charge of building the socialist 
society. According to Gorbachev, it was Lenin that created and implemented NEP, going 
so far in his seventieth anniversary speech to discredit Nikolai Bukharin in favor of Lenin 
with regard to flie NEP policy. However, Volkogonov sharply contradicts Gorbachev's 
defense by asserting: 
Nor did we reaUze that the NEP was not an economic strategy, but merely a 
tactical maneuver forced on Lenin by Ihe devastating collapse of the genuinely 
Leninist policy of War Communism. Lenin, far from being the initiator of NEP, 
was in fact its long-time foe.^ 
^ Mikhail S.Gorbachev, Perestroika: New TTiinking for Our Country and the World (New York; Harper & 
Row Publishers, 1987), 50. 
® Dmitri Volkogonov, Lenin; A New Biography (New York; The Free Press, 1994), 477 
'' Ibid., 478. 
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Considering Gorbachev's position in the Party as leader of economic reform, it was to 
his benefit to link Lenin with NEP and then to perestroika. In such capacity he could 
appeal to both the Party and to tiie public to support perestroika, as a revolutionary cause 
with a distinctive nationalistic flavor. 
The previous economic policies that were implemented in the Soviet Union had 
consistently focussed on Party planning under the bureaucratic structure of Gosplan, 
started in 1921 in conjimction with >JEP. Plotting Five-Year Plans was invariably the 
responsibility of Gosplan, as the state planning committee, but the plans were not 
progressive enough to make the nation competitive with the global economy. Acceding 
to Shane, the Soviet Union was accustomed to taking second place behind the U.S. in 
terms of technological development but when "certain Asian countries, toward which 
they had always felt a patronizing superiority"* surpassed tiie Soviets, tiie modernization 
of their economics became urgent. 
An important consideration of Gorbachev's perestroika reform is that the primary 
intention was to rejuvenate the economic situation, a traditional albeit innovative action. 
Gorbachev's initial reform was termed "acceleration," designed to increase rapidly 
economic development. However, acceleration was a short-lived slogan that produced 
only more brainstorming to fix the pressing issues of economic stagnation. 
According to Gorbachev, perestroika was mainly concerned with economic 
restructuring and political restructuring to flie degree that the Party should be 
® Scott Shane, Dismantling Utopia: How Infonnation Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
Publisher, 1994), 69. 
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strengthened by accountability to perestroika. Gorbachev's Party logic is evident in his 
publication on perestroika that emphasizes repeatedly the authority of the Parly in leading 
&e social order to economic progress.^ Doder and Branson's account illiistrates 
Gorbachev's intent was "to change the nature of the Communist Party without 
endangering its primacy However, he began to sense the urgency was not about 
economic acceleration but rather the factor of accoimtability. 
Doder and Branson chronicle the process of perestroika noting that, in 1986 wlien 
Gorbachev spoke in terms of democratization in the Soviet Union, he was candid about 
the lack of "opposition" in the Party By the following year he admitted that the nation 
had not experienced democratic traditions but expressed the hope that "we have to search 
for truth together."^^ Grorbachev's reform glasnost was presented after perestroika, as a 
secondary initiative because the evidence that perestroika had not invigorated economics 
was apparent by 1986. As explained by Doder and Branson, Gorbachev's realization that 
perestroika was not motivating the Party to efifect change in the political sphere meant 
^t he had to appeal to the masses. It is of particular importance to understand that 
Gorbachev evaluated glasnost as a way to enlist support for perestroika with the sole 
objective being the rejuvenation of economics. If he could not count on the Party for 
support he would use glasnost to stimulate the people to support perestroika. 
' Groibachev, Perestroika. 
Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Penguin Books, 
1990), 77 
" Ibid. 
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The very idea of a Soviet leader relying on the people and not the Party to effect 
change was a move toward democratization. For decades the Party's Central Committee 
directed every area of life in the Soviet Union without any legitimate democratic 
participation from the people. Glasnost allowed the openness necessaiy to advance 
perestroika, an approach Gorbachev describes in Memoirs: 
It was obvious that the poUcy of perestroika was seen by many as just another 
campaign, which would soon run out of steam. We had to eliminate doubts of 
this kind and convince people of the need for the new course, and so the theme of 
glasnost -'transparency'- came up in the report. 'Democracy does not and cannot 
exist without glasnost.' 
Gorbachev's appeal to the Soviet population was that they were now legitimately 
involved in his reform process and, consequently, in the political processes of the nation. 
Grorbachev's recognition of the democratization factor that glasnost provided was 
genuine, as evidenced in his book, yet tiie critical turning point revolved aroxmd his 
interpretation of democratization. 
Gorbachev's Democratic Reforni Glasnost 
It is essential to imderstand how Gorbachev interpreted glasnost's objective, 
democratization through openness, to comprehend fully why, after more than seven 
decades, a Soviet leader of a communist supeipower would embrace democracy in 
reform. Perhaps, one of the key points can be found in W. Bruce Lincoln's analysis 
involving glasnost in the courts of Alexander II. According to Lincoln, glasnost meant an 
Gorbachev, Memoirs. 195. 
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eradication of those characteristics that lead to corruption in government Glasnost was 
set forth for the definite objective of advancing politics, as explained by Prince Petr 
Dolgorukov in 1857 when he decried corruption in the administration 2md advocated 
openness to expel such tendencies; 
Without the broad development of glasnost' the government will never have the 
opportunity to recognize all the abuses [in its administration] and thus will never 
have the opportunity to eradicate Ihem... .Glasnost' is the best physician for the 
ulcers of the state.... A wise use of glasnost' is the best weapon for destroying 
false rumors, secret schemes, absurd and evil hearsay. By permitting all civic 
interest groups to express themselves openly, but peacefully and properly, the 
government will give peaceful and calm expression to all legal demands. A 
reasonable and proper discussion of various questions will supply the government 
with informatimi about the needs and requirements of Russia.^ 
Dolgorukov's appeal mirrors Gorbachev's in that both men urge openness in the society 
as a way to enforce accountability in the government. Particularly, Lincoln assesses 
Dolgorukov's position on glasnost to '"become the mortar to bind Tsar, educated opinion, 
and the masses into an invincible force that could overcome all reactionary sentiment and 
all self-interested opposition to reform in Russia." The defining feature of glasnost in 
the IP"* century was as a way to engage pubUc sentiment according to lawfulness. Such 
an analysis extends easily to Gorbachev's glasnost approach more tiian century later. 
In his book Perestroika. published at the beginning of his reform campaign, 
Gorbachev invokes the use of glasnost, but only marginally and specifically in support of 
the perestroika objectives. In ui^g glasnost, Gorbachev remarks in his book; 
We have begun drafting bills fliat should gu^antee glasnost These bills are 
designed to ensure the greatest possible openness in the work of government and 
W Bruce Lincoln, In the Vangxiard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats. 1825-1861 (DeKalb, 
Illinois: Northern University Press, 1982), 185. 
" Ibid. 
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mass oiiganizations and to enable working people to e?^)ress Hieir opinion on 
any issue of social life and government activity without fear.^^ 
In calling for democratic reform Gorbachev is careful to align glasnost witti the proper 
objectives, that of a socialist state. The reconciliation is difficult for the Western 
perspective primarily because glasnost, implying democratization through 
participation, seems predisposed to challenge the Soviet system, not to conform to it. 
However, it is important to gain the Russian, and therefore Soviet, perspective, which 
leads back to Lincoln's conclusions regarding glasnost 
Gorbachev is consistent in connecting glasnost, democracy, and socialism Ihrou^out 
Perestroika. establishing glasnost as the impetus for bringing democracy to improve 
socialism, ttierefore ensuring the success of perestroika. Gorbachev's claims that "[u]pon 
the success of perestroika depends the future of socialism," and only five paragraphs later 
contends, "Soviet people are convinced that as a result of perestroika and democratization 
the country will become richer and stronger."^® Gorbachev's desire to unite socialism 
and democratization Ihrou^ glasnost is clearly stated in Perestroika. yet for all his good 
intentions Gorbachev's vision was flawed. 
Primarily, Gorbachev could not inspire both democratization and the strengthening of 
socialism in a nation ^at never enjoyed democracy or socialism. With regard to 
democratization, Gorbachev admits that the Soviets were "going through a school of 
democracy again. We are learning. We lack political culture."^^ The principles of 
democracy had been a fundamental topic to the Soviets since Lenin assembled his 
Mikhail S.Gorbachev, Perestroika:New Tliinking For Our Country and the World (New York; Harper & 
Row Publishers), 76. 
Ibid., 58. 
" Ibid., 82. 
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revolutionary forces, yet, as Volkogonov argues, "it is difficult to understand what 
Lenin meant by democracy." It becomes no less difficult a task to understand what 
Gorbachev meant by democracy. 
At the start of his book Gorbachev states that "according to Lenin, socialism and 
democracy are indivisible." However, Gorbachev goes on to enqihasize the 
importance of "expanding democracy.. .[to] unfold the entire potential of democracy." '̂ 
Additionally, Gorbachev sets up socialism as the desired outcome for his nation, calling 
for "more socialism and therefore, more democracy."^" For Gorbachev, socialism and 
democracy were also indivisible but not as a unified socialist democratic order. 
Gorbachev evaluated democracy as &e means to achieving tiie socialism end. 
Democracy was an independent factor in die rush to strengthen socialism in the Soviet 
Union, a position ttvat becomes apparent in the way Gorbachev uses both terms. 
Socialism aid democracy are used independently throughout Ihe majority of his writing, 
establishing his conviction that socialism was the system of choice and democracy was 
only necessary to the finite degree of obtaining such a system 
The premise that Gorbachev viewed democracy as a means to a greater end carries 
over to the glasnost reform. For Gorbachev, glasnost meant an opportunity to enlist the 
participation of society in a single objective. His strategy to involve the population was 
well intentioned yet, "[a]s an empiricist, who treated ideas primarily as tools of practical 
judgement,"^^ he failed to realize the power that intangible ideas and Noughts are 
Volkogonov, Lenin:A New Biography. 69. 
" Gorbachev, Perestroika. 32. 
^Ibid., 37 
Doder and Branson. Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin. 73. 
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capable of. The inherent contradiction involving glasnost was that Gori)achev 
perceived reform as one-dimensional, as evidenced in his insistence ^t one goal must be 
achieved: 
Li my opinion, any honest, open talk, even if it arouse doubts, should be 
welcomed. But if you try to fit somebody else's suit on us, beware! Glasnost is 
aimed at strengthening our society. . .Only those whom socialist democracy and 
our demands for responsibility prevent from satisfying their personal ambitions, 
which are, anyway, far removed from the people's interest, can doubt this.^^ 
The primacy of socialism is also parent by the way Gorbachev literally places the 
socialist term ahead of democracy in his speeches and writing. Such indicators reveal the 
major importance in Gorbachev's reform to be socialism, a position that, according to 
Shane, legitimately characterized Gorbachev. 
Democracy throu^ glasnost was a secondary factor in Gorbachev's reforms because 
democracy never existed in either Russia or flie Soviet Union. Although Gorbachev 
embraced glasnost in the reform process, referring to glasnost as providing more truth 
and light, he did not conceive of glasnost as potentially threatening to the reform 
objective of socialism. To the contrary, Gorbachev considered glasnost as in line with 
the Party directives, otherwise he would have never called for such a reform. 
The task of comprehending what Gorbachev had in mind when he urged a democratic 
reform to achieve a single objective becomes complicated due to the socialist standard 
that Gorbachev was influenced by throughout his life. In the Soviet Union, as so many 
scholars and authors have argued, democratic socialism was never accomplished with the 
Bolshevik Revolution. Consequently, Gorbachev's ideal of democratic society or 
socialism witti a democratic flavor, was never groimded in juiything tiiat had previously 
Gorbachev, Perestroika, 79. 
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existed in reality. Therefore, the Soviet leader legitimately struck out in a different 
direction when he called for democratization in his country. The pivotal point was that 
gilasnost epitomized democracy, especially due to Gorbachev's definition, but the Soviet 
leader refused to concede that glasnost would effect anything other than restructuring the 
Party in terms of making it less corrupt and more efficient as the vanguard of the working 
population. In achieving this particular objective Gorbachev felt that more public 
participation was required in directing Hie economic and political course of the nation to 
fulfill the true socialist goals put forth by Marxist/Leninist ideals. The refinement of 
Marxism-Leninism led Gorbachev to encourage public interaction with the political 
authority of the Party 
According to Gorbachev's prescribed course of action, glasnost was to free public 
communication to benefit &e goals of tiie Party in redirecting tiie economic structure. 
Specifically, glasnost would allow tiie liberty to conununicate within media forms such 
as radio and television broadcasts, news and magazine publications, and public forums of 
discussion. Such venues provided, according to Gorbachev, the perfect opportunity to 
advance socialism. 
Glasnost would cany the message of socialism to the masses and inspire them to 
contribute to the cause in the spirit of a true workers government. Gorbachev believed in 
the power of glasnost to democratize the Soviet Union, but under his terms. His 
convictions are prevalent throughout his writing in which he calls for truA, light, and 
sincere commimication, citing glasnost as "a vivid example of a normal and favorable 
atmosphere in society."" Gorbachev's support for glasnost is evident as he urges a return 
" Ibid., 75. 
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of consciousness to the population yet the restrictive overtones in his words cannot be 
escaped. 
As Shane observes, Gorbachev was the quintessential communist, dedicated to the 
Marxist-Leninist ideal As a result, Gorbachev "operated.. .inside the Soviet illusion,"" 
a position that afforded only restricted viewpoints. Sigiiificantly, Shane e?q>lains that 
Lenin too was heartened by flie possibility of radio broadcasting in the Soviet Union at 
the beginning of tiie twentieth-century but only to promote Soviet propaganda and 
combat the opposition. Lenin was very aware of the power of the press. As flie foimder 
of his newspaper Iskra. or "The Spark," in 1900, Lenin used words to fuel the Bolshevik 
revolution. However, once accomplished, Lenin promptly dismissed the idea of 
information from media sources made available to the population, because his ideological 
judgment and method of government could not afford to be challenged. 
For Gorbachev, acceptance of the Leninist principles was inbred. Gorbachev, like 
Lenin, did not fathom the necessity to challenge the Soviet system. Glasnost was 
therefore only to stimulate thou^t along the same channels of the accepted train of 
tiiou^t. Gorbachev clung to Lenin throu^out the entire reform process, depending on 
the image of the Communist icon to shore support for glasnost As if Lenin were the 
essence of democracy, Gorbachev relied on every aspect of Leninism to give credibility 
to glasnost Doder and Branson point out that glasnost, as a term, became particularly 
valuable to the reform process when researchers discovered Lenin had used the word 
twenty-three times. The most critical point is that Gorbachev believed glasnost would 
Shane, Dismantling Utopia. 70. 
Doder and Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin. 75. 
develop socialism along the lines of Leninism and in so doing create a stronger more 
eJSicient socialism because he also believed lhat goal to be correct. 
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Why "New Thinking" Was Incompatible With The "Old Party" 
Characterizing glasnost as a democratic reform capable of resurrecting the stagnant 
economics and the weaiy Soviet population, Gorbachev set about implementing glasnost. 
It is of particular interest that he referred to the legislation of glasnost as some type of 
benevolent release of communication controls in die pursuit of truth. Perhaps his 
underestimation of the power of glasnost was not so much attributed to his lack of 
democratic experience as to his unyielding expectation. 
Attenq)ting to set a personal example of openness, Gorbachev adopted the slogan of 
"new thinking" to define his intentions for the Soviet nation and its place internationally. 
It cannot be argued that Gorbachev's first priority was the improvement of the economic 
system, particularly in achieving an improved position in the global economy. However, 
Gorbachev's concern was also the improvement of the image of Soviets, domestically 
and globally. Much of his writing reiterates the "glorious revolution," and expounds on 
the greatness of Lenin. The pragmatic politician neglected to imderstand that thinkii^ 
cannot be confined to a single thought nor directed to a single goal, especially when 
dealing with a nation of multiethnic peoples all e:!q)eriencing a diverse array of history 
and culture. 
Gorbachev preferred to bask in the success of the Bolshevik revolution, pretending 
that everyone in the Soviet Union idoUzed Lenin and the Party equally. Calling for trutii 
througji glasnost, Gorbachev expressed the hope tiiat society would support the Party, a 
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mentality that is consistent throu^ Perestroika. as he continues to place the Party at the 
center of government and the society as spectators. Commenting on the importance of 
truth Gorbachev e;q)lains; 
Truth is the main thing. Lenin said; More light! Let the Party know everything.. 
. .[t]he Party wants every citizen to voice his opinion confidently.... [w]e have 
been drafting bills that should guarantee glasnost^ 
Unity of voice was Gorbachev's hope for ^asnost, and he encouraged truth sincerely 
toward the socialist principle. As allowed by Gorbachev and the Party, glasnost provided 
truth and inspired new thinking. 
The media responded rapidly to glasnost with a burst of competitive energy. Anxious 
to release information so long silenced under the Party's authority, news broadcasts 
expanded their format to include as much information as possible during the allotted 
time. According to Shane, television news programs cau^t the biggest share of viewing 
audiences primarily because teleA^sion was flie most efficient means of providing 
information. Television was capable of influencing millions of viewers, a fact that was 
never lost on Gorbachev who saw television as a productive political forum. 
As Gorbachev correctly surmised, content was the decisive issue. Unfortunately tiie 
content that was presented across the airwaves on programs like V^lvad- or View, and 
featured in news pubUcations as Moscow News and Ogonvok captured attention as never 
before. Shane states that; 
The unveiling of Stalinism had helped drive circulations of the boldest 
pubUcations to unheard-of heists; between 1985 and 1989, for instance, 
Ogonvok's subscribers had quintupled, from 596,000 to 3 million and climbing. 
Komsomolskava Pravda. the lively national youth newspaper, reached 20 miUion; 
the fact-packed weekly Argumenti i Fakti which a few years earUer had been 
distributed to just 10,000 Party propagandists, would top out at 35 miUion, 
Gorbachev, Perestroika. 75-77. 
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becoming the most widely circulated periodical in the world. But die biggest 
television audiences still dwarfed the draw of the press, and flie live broadcast of 
the Congress of People's Deputies was among the most-watched broadcasts of all 
time. '̂ 
Just as Gorbachev had hoped, glasnost began a radical transformation of the public 
through openness of information and communication but it was the content of 
information which stirred the public into action. 
Shane recounts Freud's assertion that, "what is repressed, has a tendency to exact 
revenge."^^ In the case of post-glasnost Soviet Union no truer words could be stated. 
Glasnost produced an avalanche of information that had been secured in KGB archives, 
restricted to unspoken memories or purposefully whited out, as in the Soviet historical 
records. The flood of information turned out to be deeply anti-Soviet in content, one 
explanation as to the incredible surge in the reading and viewing statistics. Before 
glasnost there was limited interest in the Party version of what constituted news, but after 
glasnost produced an information society, the response was prolific. 
Most si^iiiicantly, the Soviet citizens were ecstatic about the privilege of speaking out 
on issues. The most intriguing information that was presented and consumed was 
directed <igainst the Party, capturing massive amoxmts of listeners, viewers, and 
subscribers. Television reporters, press correspondents, and publication writers foimd 
both a new celebrity status and a wealth of information from tiie Soviet public. The Party 
found glasnost to be a critical threat to their power. 
Shane emphasizes, the central threat came directly to the heart of Gorbachev's 
ailment for strengthening the socialist state. Leninism was Grorbachev's hallmark of 
^ Shane, Dismantling Utopia. 145. 
Ibid., 54. 
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the socialist revolution and he used the image of Lenin to build a platfonn of support 
for the perestroika revolution, but Gorbachev was not prepared for the backlash against 
Leninism and the Party, an unexpected side-effect of glasnost Instead of imiting the 
nation, glasnost coaxed the silent majority to express disillusionment with ttie system and 
particularly toward the Party and its foimder, Lenin. 
According to Shane, by 1991 most people had completely lost faith in the Party and its 
leaders to lead the nation. Data collected through the AU-Union Center for the Study of 
Public Opinion showed a significant decrease in, not only the Party, but the entire 
Communist system in the Soviet Union. Shane remarks that "[t]he death of the Soviet 
illusion.. .took place between 1987 and 1991.. .and there are no real historical 
precedents." '̂ As Shane points out, prior to glasnost the public gave tacit support to the 
politics of Soviet Russia, yet there was never anything vaguely close to glasnost from 
which to gauge the validity of such s\q)port. Between 1989 and 1991 the Party felt the 
in:q)act of glasnost in &e most critical of ways. The Party was regarded as being wi&out 
ideological credibility. 
Gorbachev possessed a paradoxical role in the demise of Soviet communism. On one 
hand he was the leader with democratic dreams willing to risk a change in thinking to 
improve the status quo. On the other hand Gorbachev saw himself as a leader of the 
status quo that had perfected an illusion of benevolent dictatorship in a workers Utopia. 
Shane aptly characterizes the paradox: 
Gorbachev often emphasized that Ae Party itself had laimched perestroika and 
demanded glasnost, which was true enough, implying that people should tiierefore 
Ibid., 215. 
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be grateful to the Party. But if a swindler admits that he had cheated you, your 
finy at being cheated may well exceed your gratitude for his confession.'" 
"New Thinking" took Grorbachev's objectives into an entirely different direction, rapidly 
disintegrating Leninism and eliminating P»ty control in all spheres because new thinking 
literally implied a new trend of thought. More impratantly, new thinking implied 
plurality of thought, characterized as "socialist pluralism" by Goibachev.^^ According to 
Gorbachev, plurality of thought and opinion was to be in the interest of socialism, a 
definition ^t Shane observes as a prelude to the conflict that would soon split the Party 
into political opposition. 
The loosening of Paly controls in allowing new thinking contributed to the ultimate 
success of glasnost. However, the Party was ill prepared to deal with the onslaught of 
information for one very important reason. The content of the information was extremely 
damaging against the Party as the ruling eUte. If the content had been supportive to the 
communist revohitionaiy spirit, or socialist democracy, or Lenin and the Party as the sole 
authority in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's objectives would have been realized. Instead 
glasnost encouraged truth, and the truth that poured out of the Soviet population did not 
support the Party or socialist principles. 
As glasnost led to increasing hostility against the Party and the Soviet state 
Gorbachev began to retract his position concerning glasnost. Plagued by the continuing 
Cold War foreign policy as well as a growing imease within the Soviet republics, 
Gorbachev shifted from the new thinking agenda to enforce allegiance to the national 
position. Glasnost had not produced a imified socialist alliance but had fractured the 
Ibid, 219. 
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internal organs of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev chose to disregard glasnost when, by 
1989, he was aware that socialism had been rejected and the revolution discredited 
among the population. 
Shane states that Gorbachev refused to concede the communist ideology, choosing 
instead 'Ho cling to the Soviet illusion long after most of his compatriots had given it 
up."^^ Goibachev's responses to upheaval against the Party government that flared up 
throu^out the republics were a statement of his defiance against dissident activity. 
Beginning with the Baltics' bid for independence, Gorbachev reacted witii a vengeance, 
and not with the tolerance that he suggested glasnost could bring to the nation. The 
unexpected results occurring under glasnost left Gorbachev frustrated and confused on 
the reform position because glasnost was not yielding the e?q)ected results. 
Primarily, Gorbachev was a politician with a goal to increase power. Hailing from a 
single-Party nation v*^ch had held authority for over seven decades Gorbachev never 
anticipated ttie end of the Party rule in the Soviet Union because he believed, as Shane, 
Doder, Branson, and even himself have asserted, that the course v^ch Lenin had chosen 
had been a correct one. Unfortunately the results that came about through glasnost 
revealed another truth that was inescapable. Gorbachev's gamble with glasnost 
succeeded in redirecting the Leninist revolution to another destiny that was not as 
glorious for the Party as it would be for the society. 
^ Ibid., 238. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
GLASNOST'S TRUTH 
Another Soviet Citizen's Perspective: 
Andrei Sakharov 
For Academician Andrei Sakharov the point of departure from the dogmatic Soviet 
system occurred as a result of personal perspective. The respected scientist and recipient 
of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize comments: 
By the beginning of 1968,1 felt a growing compulsion to speak out on the 
fundamental issues of our age. I was influenced by my life experience and a 
feeling of personal responsibility, reinforced by the part I'd played in the 
development of the hydrogen bomb, the special knowledge I'd gained about 
thermonuclear warfare, my bitter struggle to ban nuclear testing, and my 
familiarity with the Soviet system.^ 
Sakharov's compelling position is imderscored by his own admission of existing in a 
system where he created the power of massive destruction yet was helpless to the 
consequences of such a creation. Sakharov's concern revolved around two factors which 
ignited the technological and ideological conflict of the Cold War. The primary factor 
was power to be achieved at an international level, an objective that topped the political 
priority of both the Soviet Union and America diiring most of the twentiefli-century. The 
second factor became a force that Sakharov could not effectively reconcile with his 
government. 
' Andrei D. Sakharov, Memoirs (New York; Alfred A. Knopfl 1990), 281. 
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Ethical considerations were seldom regarded to be as important as gaining and 
maintaining power in the Soviet Union. Sakharov reflects on a nation that was well 
versed in struggle, a blend of cynicism and fear that shaped "the cult of personality" by 
the middle of the 20'*' centuiy. Moreover, Sakharov became aware of a shift in the Soviet 
power position, from the initial revolutionary fervor led by the Bolsheviks to a dismissal 
of any and all that dared interfere with the growing power of the Communist Party. 
Sakharov e^qilains the contradictory nature of Lenin's Party accordingly: 
Lenin's initial impulse, and that of most of the other revolutionaries, was in 
essence humanitarian and moral; it was the logic of their struggle and the tragic 
twists of history that turned them into what they later became and dictated their 
course of action. But not only that. There was something inherently false in their 
basic pohtical and philosophical premises. That is why objectivity so often was 
supplanted by pragmatic considerations and humanism by fanaticism, and why 
the Party line and Party struggle triiunphed over moral principles.^ 
As a Soviet, Sakharov was exposed to the propagandized versions of history and fantastic 
accomplishments and goals of tiie Party. However, as a scientist who was educated to the 
magnitude of destruction possessed through technological means, Sakharov developed a 
sense of respect for creation, especially himianity. 
Typical of all academicians in the Soviet Union, Sakharov was trained and directed to 
fulfill the expectations of the Party in their objective for authority. Unlike many of his 
colleagues, Sakharov never joined Party organizations, rejecting outright an invitation to 
join the Commimist Party based on principle, yet his work as a gifted physicist won 
Sakharov recognition by the Party. Receiving awards three separate times as a Hero of 
Socialist Labor, Sakharov was a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. His 
contributions to the sciences in the area of nuclear physics established him as one of the 
^ Ibid.,33. 
60 
Soviet intelligentsia; however, Sakharov's intelligentsia activities were not limited to 
the improvement of Soviet miUtary capabihties. 
Sakharov's career in physics commenced from the early days of his education. His 
father was a physics professor and taught at several institutes and universities in die 
Soviet Union. Because Sakharov also excelled in mathematics and scientific studies he 
followed the same career as his fa^er. As Sakharov recounts, his family swore no 
particular loyalty to the Communist regime and regarded nationahsm as little more than 
political justification for exploitation. The defining feature which Sakharov claims 
influenced his perspective was the family's love of the Russian culture. literature and 
the arts provided inspiration for them, and not political power posturing on the part of the 
Commimist Party. 
As recoimted in Memoirs. Sakharov was involved in research on thermonuclear 
physics for twenty years, living and working in the secret city where Soviet nuclear 
weapons were developed, tested, and produced. Sakharov joined the Tamm group of 
scientists in 1948, the Soviet equivalent of America's Robert Oppenheimer group of 
nuclear scientists. Sakharov comments on the remorse that Oppenheimer felt in his 
contribution to nuclear capability, sharing Oppenheimer's disillusionment concerning 
"the terrifying, inhuman nature of the weapon we were building."^ Sakharov's concern 
was one also shared by his colleagues that worked at the Installation, including Igor 
Tamm. Sakharov attributes Tamm as influencing him further in appreciating the 
intelligentsia's position in national power struggles and describes Tamm as an 
^ Ibid, 97. 
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"independent spirit in matters large and small, in life and in science."^ For the 
scientists at the Installation, it was not simply a matter of creating the means of 
destruction but of understanding the motivation behind such projects and recognizing that 
true power emerges as a result of communication, and not through force. 
Sakharov emphasizes that the critical turning point for him occurred two years prior to 
the Prague Spring in 1968. Concerned about the potential rehabilitation of Stalin at the 
Twenty-third Party Congress, Sakharov's signature appeared on a letter that expressed 
tiie intelligentsia's desire to advance social causes over the political. In particular, 
Sakharov argued: 
I believe that statements on public issues are a useful means of promoting 
discussion, proposing alternatives to official poUcy, and focusing attention on 
specific problems. They educate the problem at large, and just mi^t stimulate 
significant changes, however belated, in the policy and practice of top 
government ofiicials. Appeals on behalf of specific individuals and groiq)s also 
attract attention to their cases, occasionally benefit a particular individual, and 
inhibit future hiiman ri^ts violations throu^ the threat of glasnost [public 
disclosure].^ 
Sakharov's position illustrated his intention of supporting human rights in the Soviet 
Union. As a member of the intelligentsia Sakharov was compelled to behave responsibly 
in issues of power. The Party's primary goal of securing poUtical authority had 
imdermined human rights in the Soviet Union, a fact that Sakharov became increasingly 
aware of by 1968. 
Upon making the acquaintance of history Professor Roy Medvedev in 1966, Sakharov 
gained great insight concerning "dissidents and events of social significance.. .they did 
" Ibid, 128. 
= Ibid.,271. 
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help me escape from my hermetic world."® When Sakharov read Medvedev's 
manuscr^t Let ESstorv Judge, which describes Stalin's crimes against the people, he was 
compelled to place blame not only on Stalin but upon the Communist regime which 
consolidated power in such a way as to suppress individual rights without benefit of 
accountability, politically or ethically. 
At about the same time Sakharov met Medvedev, he began receiving, in secret, 
information about political dissidents, arrested and confined in psychiatric institutions or 
prisons for anti-Soviet violations. Sakharov found himself among the ranks of 
intelligentsia that objected to the practice of repressing Soviet citizens according to Party 
standards. Encouraged by publications such as Medvedev's and Valeiy Skurlatov's 
samizdat circulation A Code of Morals. Sakharov wrote letters to Party ofGcials on behalf 
of dissidents, a decision that cost him his lead position at the Installation as well as a 
salary reduction. Undaunted, Sakharov continued to utilize literary publications to 
express his views on individual rights including a 1967 investigative article on toxic 
pollutants in Lake Baikal. Despite Sakharov's personal calls to Leonid Brezhnev and 
Andrei Kosygin, his article was dismissed; however, his dissident activities had caught 
flie attention of Party officials. 
According to Sakharov, <he events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, known as tiie Prague 
Spring, coincided witii his essay Reflections on Progress. Peaceful Coexistence, and 
Intellectual Freedom. Sakharov describes the Prague Spring in this way: 
What so many of us in the socialist countries had been dreaming of seemed to be 
finally coming to pass in Czechoslovakia: democracy, including freedom of 
expression and abolition of censorship; reform of the economic and social 
® Ibid, 272. 
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systems; ciirbs on the power of the security forces, limiting them to defense 
against external flireats; and full disclosure of tiie crimes of &e Stalin 
era.. .Even from afar, we were caught up in the excitement and hopes and 
enthusiasm of the catchwords: "Prague Spring" and "socialism widi a human 
fece."^ 
Acknowledging the effects of the Prague Spring as "harbingers of the human rights 
movement" in the Soviet Union, Sakharov describes the KGB response as "taking tough 
countermeasures: firing, blacklisting, public reprimand, expulsion from the Party."^ 
According to Sakharov, the title he chose for his essay reflected the concerns that the 
citizens in flie Soviet Union held. Regardless of ethnic or cultural division, Sakharov's 
intent was to bring awareness to universal issues that affected all of humanity. His essay 
spoke on the disadvantages of nuclear arms in the world and argued for "convergence" 
between capitalist and socialist societies. Additionally, he ai^ed the virtues of such a 
world order would have democratic features and honor diversity of thought, existing as 
"an open society.'"^ Although Sakharov's essay revealed, as he describes, his Utopian 
premise for a world govermnent, he stood committed to principles involving 
humanitarian progress, a position that encouraged him to send a copy of the essay to 
Brezhnev ratiier than engaging in the typical clandestine activity characteristic of Soviet 
reformers. 
The events of the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion by Soviet troops closely reflected 
tiie circumstances in the Soviet Union. Antonin Novotny established himself as a 
Communist Party member under the Stalin regime, becoming President of 
Czechoslovakia in 1957. As a Party official Novotny's {irinciple was consolidating 
'' Ibid., 281/2. 
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control with the same dictatorial precision that Stalin used to secure his power. 
Z. A. B. Zeman describes Novotny's regime as "manipulators [that] had absolute power, 
without having accepted absolute responsibility." Absolute power included authority 
over publications and circulation of information, a situation which Zeman points out was 
unheard of for the Czechs under the Habsburg empire. In 1967 the Czechoslovakia press 
law was legislated providing strict censorship for writers and publishers, stating that 
articles must comply with the "ideological guidance issued by the Communist Party. 
As Zeman points out, Czech writers have traditionally integrated political commentary in 
their literature. The suppression of information by an external goverranent went directly 
against the Czech consciousness and encouraged a national uprising. 
In addition to the Czech rebellion the Slovak population resisted Moscow's dictates in 
political and socioeconomic policies. In January of 1968, Slovakian Alexander Dubcek 
replaced Novotny as Czecholslovakia's President, a move that precipitated the rise of 
Czech and Slovak nationalism against the Party. As president, Dubcek led a reform 
movement intent on restructuiing the system toward empowering social issues. The 
"April Action Programme" called for division of power and freedoms to commimicate 
and be informed, uiging con:q)etition to ensure democracy. Zeman comments that; 
the most sensitive and crucial issue in Czechoslovak politics at the present time, 
the early summer of 1968. . .'if the Commimist Party does not provide for the 
fastest development of its effective control from the outside, it wiU have no 
guarantee that it will not degenerate at some later time. The communists have 
been asked to recognize what the non-communists have known for years: That 
sociaUsm sacrifices democracy at its own peril. 
Z. A. B. Zeman, Prague Spring (New York: Hill and Wang Inc.,1969), 40. 
" Ibid., 47. 
Ibid., 127 
65 
Dubcek's appeal for a unified opposition of Czechs and Slovaks against a single 
authority was interpreted by Moscow as a direct threat against the Communist Party. 
Amid Warsaw Pact manoeuvres the Russians conducted talks with the Czechs, stressing 
the importance of controlling publications in order to control the position of power. The 
Czechs rejected Moscow's line of reasoning which prompted Moscow to force 
compliance. Without warning Soviet tanks moved into Czechoslovakia on August 20, 
1968 and arrested Dubcek with ''other Czech and Slovak leaders.. .in the name of the 
'revolutionary government of the workers and peasants." The defeat of 
Czechoslovakia's bid for democratic liberties alerted Sakharov and other Soviet 
dissidents to the social injustices present throughout the Soviet Union at the expense of 
personal freedom. 
When interviewed by Scandinavian broadcast correspondent Olle Stenholm 
concerning the 1973 Anti-Sakharov canqiaign conducted by the Paty, Sakharov 
specifically spoke about the lack of freedom as the most critical issue facing Soviet 
society. In the interview Sakharov characterized the Soviet Union as "extremely 
irrational and also terribly egoistic.. .[a] tendency that actually aims at preserving the 
system, maintaining a good appearance to conceal a very unpleasant internal state of 
affairs.. .for us all social things are more for show than for reality The crux of the 
interview centers on ideological structure, with Sakharov describing the Soviet Union 
" Ibid.,167-
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as anti-democratic, a society of "ideological monism" which has strangled society's 
potential and leading to a debilitation throughout the nation. When asked what is needed 
Sakharov responded: 
Our extreme state socialism has led to tiie elimination of private initiative in areas 
in which it would be most effective.. .tiie suppression of individual initiative 
leads to strict constraints on personal freedom. .. I am talking about personal 
enterprise in the field of consumer goods, education, and medicine. All of this no 
doubt would have a very positive significance in weakening die extreme 
monopoUstic structure of the state. The Party monopoly of administration has 
reached such unheard-of levels that even tiie ruling class must realize it can no 
longer be tolerated. So—^what is needed? We need first of all greater glasnost, 
openness in the work of the administrative ^>paratus.*^ 
Sakharov goes on to expand on the need for competitive elections and for freedom of the 
press. He comments that the intelligentsia has been driven into "ideological de^adation" 
as a result of the low lifestyle and ill regard toward intellectualism in the nation. 
In 1973, when the interview was conducted, Sakharov's position on the societal needs 
in the Soviet Union resembled closely that of Gorbachev more than a decade later. The 
defining point between Sakharov and Goibachev when discussing glasnost and society is 
the role of the Party. While Sakharov views the Soviet Union under the leadership of the 
Patty as anti-democratic and anti-socialist, Gorbachev holds fast to die Leninist ideal that 
the Party remain at the pinnacle of power, a perspective that dminishes the glasnost 
principle of openness. 
Political Dissidents; Citizens or Comrades? 
By 1968 when Sakharov became engaged in publishing his own thoughts and opinions 
about the idea of an "open society" in Reflections, he also began to acquire a following of 
Ibid., 629 
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Soviet dissidents. The presence of a distinguished intellectual such as Sakharov was an 
encouraging sign that perhaps, real commtmication on reform issues for society could 
begin with the government Sakharov's own commitment to reform was largely inspired 
by the ethical considerations which surrounded the scientific profession during the Cold 
War era. According to Sakharov, the point of departure from the establishment came 
between the years 1965 to 1967 \n^en he acknowledged global fundamental issues to be 
political and ethical and not &e military and economical behemoth that occupied the 
Soviet agenda. 
The distinction of Sakharov's turning point was critical, a departure from the 
ideological framework of commtmism that Lenin had created and which was perpetuated 
by decades of propagandized information. In order to maintain the position of power the 
Party resorted not only to massive propaganda campaigns, but also to a narrowly defined 
code of conduct befitting the model Soviet citizen. In a nation that portrayed itself as a 
socialist Utopia the members of society found themselves at a crossroads with regard to 
national identity. Under Soviet terms people were considered comrades, that is a person 
wholly dedicated to tiie socialist system with die pretense that &e system defined them 
and knew what was best for everyone in the system. As Shane explains: 
From the beginning the Soviet regime was built on a system of belief, a 
mythology that citizens learned from earliest childhood and that su&used every 
aspect of life. Soviet nine-year-olds were given a book about Lenin called Our 
Very Best Friend, maiking their entry into the Pioneers. Its 1978 edition told 
tiiem: "We see how day by day, hour by hour, with enthusiasm, joy and pride the 
Soviet people are building the radi<uit edifice of Commimism. You, kids, also 
will build Conmumist society, and not only build but work under Communism. 
Scott Shane, DismantJing Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee 
Publisher, 1994), 55. 
Shane emphasizes that all societies have their mythologies in order to stimulate 
allegiance to the system, yet the Soviet approach insisted on that allegiance from their 
citizens, refusing to accept any deviations from the Party line. 
In maintaining its autocratic stiucture the Party legislated control factors designed 
specifically to restrict controversial trends in the nation. Many Soviet comrades were not 
allowed to educate themselves or obtain information suited to tiieir personal interests 
without government intervention, and by the mid-sixties, Soviet officials were avidly 
prosecuting any dissenters who refused to honor the Soviet law concerning information 
and communication. 
The RSFSR, or Russian State Federation of Soviet Republics, implemented flie 
Criminal Code that defined unacceptable publications. As supplemented by Peter 
Reddaway, Article 70 states: 
'Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening 
Soviet power or of committing particular especially dangerous crimes against the 
state, or the [verbal] spreading for the same purpose of slanderous fabrications 
which defame the Soviet political and social system, or the circulation or 
preparation or keeping, for tiie same purpose, of literature of such content, shall 
be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of six montiis to seven years, 
with or without additional exile for a term of two to five years, or by exile for a 
term of two to five years.' 
Article 190-1 reads: 
The systematic dissemination by word of mouth of deliberate fabrications 
discrediting the Soviet political and social system, or the manufacture or 
dissemination in written, printed or other form of works of the same content, shall 
be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding three years, or by 
corrective labour for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding 
one hundred roubles. 
" Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia. (Jonathan Cape, 1972), 11. 
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According to Sakharov, Article 70 preceded 190-1 in making the publication and 
circulation of anti-Soviet material a criminal action, and Article 190-1 served more as a 
det^ent for dissidents of the system. Sakharov argues that, despite an amended 
commentary in 1971 explaining that "ttie circulation of fabrications which are not known 
to be false by the Party responsible, as well as the expression of mistaken opinions or 
suppositions do not constitute crimes under Article 190-1,"'* the courts routinely 
bypassed the commentary in order to prosecute more dissidents. Anything deemed by the 
courts to be of anti-Soviet information was interpreted as proof of dissident activity and 
punishable by law. 
The incidence of political dissidents implicated under Article 190-1 increased 
substantially. Sakharov's involvement as a human rights activist initiated him into the 
world of tiie dissidents, v^o objected both openly and in secret against the intrusions of 
the Party in matters of communication and information. In adctition to protesting the 
content of Article 190-1 Sakharov was a co-founder of the Human Rights Committee of 
1970. Together with Valery Chalidze and Andrei Tverdokhlebov, the Committee gained 
international recognition for tiieir efforts in combating injustices involving freedom of 
expression and the right to dispense information. The committee was laimched largely in 
response to a rising number of dissident prosecutions in the Soviet Union, although 
Sakharov acknowledges the formation in 1969 of the Initiative Group for the Defense of 
Human Ri^ts, as the first organization to formally appeal to the United Nations on 
behalf of human ri^ts in flie USSR.'' Still, with the Human Rights Committee of 
Ibid., 270. 
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November 1970 the publicity for dissidents began to attract attenti<m at an international 
level. The contrived accusations by the Party against members of society only worsened 
after Sakharov's attempt at publicizing the human ri^ts issues in the USSR. Moreover, 
as Sakharov recalls, dissidents were subjected to inhumane abuses which were condoned 
the Soviet political system in an effort to force compliance. Sakharov was among a 
growing population of Soviets who understood, in the mid-sixties, ttiat recognition of 
system injustice was essential to the progress of humanity in die USSR. 
Because the Party was unable to suppress completely all the channels of 
c(nnmunication, such as radio broadcasts and the open circulation of information, the 
incidence of dissident activity increased. At a time when Soviet citizens experienced 
disillusionment with the Utopian illusion of the socialist system, the nature of dissident 
activity was broadly interpreted by the auttiorities so lhat trivial indulgences, such as 
listening to foreign broadcasts or reading literature imacceptable to Soviet Party standards 
came under tihe criminal code of conduct. 
Shane reviews the case of Andrei Mironov who was arrested in 1985 for consorting 
with foreigners and engaging in anti-Soviet activities. Particularly, Mironov was 
punished because he shared "subversive" information and opinions with the public. 
Shane chronicles Mironov's struggle with Soviet authorities as he attempts to circulate 
books, newspapers, and magazines tiiat had been banned by the Party's publication 
censors, Glavlit. Additionally, the KGB charged Mironov with "anti-Soviet agitation and 
propaganda with the aim of imdermining and weakening Soviet power, spreading 
slanderous fabrications, discrediting the Soviet state and social system."^" Among his 
^ Shane, Dismantiing Utopia. 40. 
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criminal actions Mironov had copied and distributed copies of the "sami^at", or self-
published materials, a crime that ignited die forces of KGB agents intent on apprehending 
the culprit before forbidden information could reach too many citizens. Mironov 
explained to Shane that the KGB expended so much energy in tailing and observing his 
illegal information activities that it became ridiculous. Still, the KGB acconq)lished the 
in^sonment of Mironov with "five fat volimies of evidence" in violation of Article 70. 
The birth of samizdat in the Soviet Union came in 1966 at precisely the time Sakharov 
and other intelligentsia members recognized the contradictions present in a nation that 
professed socialism to be the ideal system yet, persecuted growing numbers of citizens 
who rejected Party values in the interest of diversification of personal knowledge. The 
contradictions were represented in samizdat publications such as the Chronicle, that 
regarded the ri^t to expression as fundamental to citizens regardless of state ideology. 
Unfortunately, the Party did not regard the ri^t of free expression to be in keeping wifli 
flie Commimist ideology, a single-minded logic that perceived alternative mentalities as a 
threat to the system. Still tiie Commimist ideology and the Soviet state was not a system 
of choice for tiie millions of citizens vdio now fell in tiie Soviet Union's borders, and the 
contributors to samizdat became "the U.S.S.R.'s only forum of free thought."^^ 
Challenging the suppression of information in the only way possible became a 
calculated risk for many citizens. However, the exhilaration of freedom of 
communication only encouraged contributors to samizdat journals such as the Chronicle. 
Censorship could be escaped long enough to explore other reahns of thought and created 
an impetus to form tiie Democratic Movement, described by Reddaway as being 
Ibid. 19. 
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consistently diverse. According to Reddaway, the defining quality of the Democratic 
Movement rested in its objectives to address the realities of the Soviet system, rather than 
conceding to Party dictates. Specifically, Reddaway regards tiie de-Stalinization speech 
which Khrushchev delivered in 1956 as a "feeling.. .among the liberal intelligentsia that 
the Communist Party did not—contrary to its claims—^know aU the answers, moreover 
was capable of gross errors. In effect, Reddaway argues the role of the intelligentsia 
was integral in calling attenticm to social injustices committed by the Party against the 
citizens. 
The Chronicle was foimded in the spring of 1968, and according to Reddaway, strove 
to define Article 19 of the U.N. 's Universal Declaration of Human Ri^ts which states: 
Everyone has the ri^t to fi'eedom of opinion and expression; this ri^t includes 
fieedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media md regardless of fi^ntiers.^^ 
Essentially, the publication, although operating covertly, embodied the truer principles of 
democracy by allowing diversity of thought among the population. The primary 
objective of the Chronicle, according to Reddaway, is " openness, non-secretiveness, 
fi^edom of information and expression. . .in the one Russian word glasnost."  ̂ The 
contrary point was that the Soviet Union's single political Party could not afford to allow 
diversity of thought in an open forum because it threatened its power consequently, the 
rights of society had to be sacrificed for tiie stability of the system. 
The presence of samizdat in the Soviet Union indicates that a certain segment of the 
society was at odds witii the system, refijsing to concede entirely to Party censorship and 
Reddaway, Uncensored Russia. 22. 
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risking punishment to communicate freely with fellow citizens. The comrade would 
have obeyed Party standards without question, but the Soviet citizen was consumed with 
questions, and in the spirit of glasnost, he desired truth in the answers. 
Why Glasnost Triumphed in Society 
Most notable to glasnost is that the desire to communicate freely and wi&out 
restriction was already prevalent in Soviet society. Despite millions of political prisoners 
and the arbitrary rule of Soviet law, which denied a more progressive standard with 
regard to commimication and freedom of information, there existed in society the natural 
instinct to expression. The evidence lies in the testimonies of the political dissidents, 
numbers too massive to be accurately accoimted for, yet their plight has not gone 
unrecognized. 
Ironically, those that have been silenced by the system continued to commimicate, 
proving that communication cannot be forever controlled by political policies. One of the 
exemplary literary figures of the Soviet era was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. While serving 
in World War n Solzhenitsyn was sentenced to eight years in a labor camp and then 
exiled for writing in a personal letter a criticism of Stalin. After Khrushchev's de-
Stalinization speech Solzhenitsyn was rehabilitated and published his first novel in 1962, 
One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. Althou^ the Soviet writer was nominated for 
the Lenin Prize in Literature for his work he was denied it because of the controversial 
nature of the novel's content. Solzhenitsyn continued to write, but his stories were 
seldom published by Soviet journals that argued the literature could be used by foreign 
powers to attack the Soviet regime. Consequently, Solzhenitsyn was published in the 
lA 
West, a situation that always compromised political reliabiUty of Soviet authors. As a 
iiiither consequence, Solzhenitsyn was e^qielled from the U.S.S.R,'s Writer's Union in 
the aiitunm of 1969, an event that tiie Chronicle described as "the extent to which Soviet 
dissenters of all persuasions look to Solzhenitsyn for a moral example."" As 
documented by Reddaway, Solahenitsyn responded to the expulsion with a letter that 
emphasizes the need for openness: 
Shamelessly trampling imderfoot your own statues, you have expelled me in 
my absence, as at the soimd of a foealarm, without even sending me a summons 
by telegram, without even giving me the four hours I needed to come from 
Ryazan and be present at the meeting. You have shown openly that the 
RESOLUTION preceded the 'discussion'. Was it less awkward for you to invent 
new charges in my absence? Were you afraid of being obliged to grant me ten 
minutes for my answer? I am compelled to substitute this letter for those ten 
minutes. 
Blow Hhe dust off the clock. Your watches are behind the times. Throw open 
tiie heavy curtains which are so dear to you—^you do not even suspect that the day 
has already dawned outside. It is no longer that stifled, that sombre, irrevocable 
time when you expelled Akhmatova in the same servile manner. It is not even 
tiiat timid, frosty period v\iien you expelled Pasternak, whining abuse at him. 
Was this shame not enough for you? Do you want to make it greater? But the 
time is near when each one of you will seek to erase his signature from today's 
resolution. 
Blind leading the blind! You do not even notice that you are wandering in the 
opposite direction from the one you yourselves have annoimced. At this time of 
crisis you are incapable of suggesting anything constructive, anything good for 
our society, which is gravely sick—only your hatred, your vigilance, your 'hold 
on and don't let go'. 
Your clumsy articles fall apmt; your vacant minds stir feebly—^but you have 
no arguments. You have only your voting and your administration. And that is 
why neither Sholokhov nor any of you, of the whole lot of you, dared reply to the 
famous letter of Lydia Chukovskaya, who is the pride of Russian pubhcistic 
writing. But tiie administrative pincers are ready for her; how could she allow 
people to read her book fThe Deserted House/ when it has not been published? 
Once the AUTHORITIES have made up their minds not to publish you—then 
stifle yourself, choke yourself, cease to exist, and don't give your stuff to anyone 
to read! 
They are also tiiu'eatening to expel Lev Kopelev, the front-line veteran, who 
has already served ten years in prison although he was completely irmocent. 
Ibid. 339. 
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Today he is guilty: he intercedes for the persecuted, he revealed the hallowed 
secrets of his conversation with an influential person, he disclosed an OFFICIAL 
SECRET. But why do you hold conversations like these which have to be 
concealed from tiie people? Were we not promised fifty years ago that never 
again would there be any secret diplomacy, secret talks, secret and 
incomprehensible appointments and transfers, that the masses would be informed 
of all matters and would discuss them openly? 
'The enemy will overhear'—that is your excuse. The eternal, omnipresent 
'enemies' are a convenient justification for your fimctions and your very 
existence. As if there were no enemies v\4ien you i»-omised immediate openness. 
But what would you do without 'enemies'? You could not live without 
'enemies'; hatred, a hatred no better than racial hatred, has become your sterile 
atmosphere. But in this way a sense of our single, common hxmianity is lost and 
its doom accelerated. Should the Antarctic ice melt tomorrow, we would all 
become a sea of drowning humanity, and into v^ose heads would you then be 
drilling your concepts of 'class struggle'? Not to speak of the time when the few 
surviving bq)eds will be wandering over a radioactive earth, ^ing. 
It is high time to remember that we belong first and foremost to humanity. 
And that man has distinguished himself from the animal world by THOUGHT 
and SPEECH. And these, naturally, should be FREE. If they are put in chains, 
we shall return to tiie state of animals. 
OPENNESS, honest and complete OPENNESS—that is the first condition of 
health in all societies, including our own. And he who does not want this 
opoiness for our country cares nothing for his fatherland and thinks only of his 
own interest. He who does not wish fliis openness for his fatherland does not 
want to purify it of its diseases, but only to driw them inwards, there to fester. 
Sol2henitsyns's e?q)ulsion was met with criticism from the Writer's Union who claimed 
that the writer slandered &e system in his literature. Solzhenistsyn's followers, including 
the scores of other Soviet writers, intelligentsia, and foreign literary publishers, spoke 
against the Soviet system, and tiieir opinions found expression in samizdat. 
SoMienitsyn, like Sakharov, found an audience of Soviet citizens through samizdat 
ttiat supported the concept of openness in society. The fact that bofli Solzhenitsyn and 
Sakharov were celebrated dissidents helped to attract outside attention from foreign 
Ibid, 341/3 
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media. However, the consequences of challenging the Soviet system did not escape 
either Sakharov or Sobihenistsyn since both received the punishment of exile. The 
objective of samizdat publications like the Chronicle hoped to call attention to the fact 
that die number of ordinaiy Soviet citizens that had joined the ranks of dissidents far 
exceeded the estimate. Reddaway emphasizes that: 
Not only do the Chronicle's contents tend to be overlooked, but the fact is also 
ignored that just as the journal has grown steadily in size, so too—despite all 
iarests—have the number of correspondents and their geogr^hical distribution. 
Certainly the Chronicle has a small circulation—^at a guess perhaps a few 
thousand copies. But many of its readers and correspondents, while politically on 
the fiinges of society, are professionally at its core: physicists, chemists, 
biologists, geologists, economists, teachers, doctors, journalists—people without 
whom society cannot progress, nor missile programmes prosper. 
Notably, i^lien Reddaway documented the pages of the Chronicle, the challenges to the 
system appeared to be at an increase. AccOTding to Reddaway in 1971, the idea that 
Sakharov could be arrested for his part in human rights activities seemed remote 
especially taking in consideration the incompetence of the Brezhnev regime. 
However, Sakharov's arrest and subsequent exile to Gorky in 1980 served as 
evidence that even if the Brezhnev administration were faltering in leadership, the system 
itself was solid enough in terms of stagnation. What was indeed a threat to the 
foimdations of Communist Party power was reform, and to this scenario Reddaway 
provides an extraordinaiy commentaiy seemingly intended for Gorbachev: 
|T|f a strong leader were to emerge, and were tiien somehow to redynamize the 
regime, he would certainly hesitate to arrest certain prominent members of the 
Democratic Movement.^® 
" Ibid., 30. 
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Reddaway continues to e?qplain that the Democratic Movement's objectives are to 
reform the system "to create closer unity, both practically and spiritually," '̂ for the 
individuals in society. The rallying point indicated by Reddaway, on the basis of his 
interviewing the contributors to samizdat, revolved around information, the right to 
obtain information and to dispense information without being subjected to Party 
censorship primarily because '̂ e movement's general aim has been flie democratization 
of Soviet society."^" Only by taking an information publication like the Chronicle 
underground could the right to communicate interactively be engaged in the Soviet 
Union, precisely because the citizens lacked that democratic privilege under the 
leadership of the Communist Party- The presence of samizdat indicates that a great 
number of Soviet citizens desired the ri^t to communicate freely, receiving information 
which they selected as a matter of personal preference. 
Additionally, the premise for democratic ri^ts was present in Soviet society at the 
time Gorbachev took office, as he admitted to in both Perestroika and Memoirs. 
For over seven decades the Soviet Union had existed as a communist nation, however, 
the absence of democratic ri^ts was increasingly obvious to the people at large after the 
major industrialization period in the Soviet Union came to a close. It is true that the Post 
World War n economic trends contributed significantly to the disparity between the 
Eastern and Western nations. In terms of economics, by the time the technological wave 
descended on Western countries, incorporating Asian nations in the expansion of 
^Ibid. 
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technological global markets, the Soviet Union began to feel the effects, especially in 
terms of inadequate information systems. Even though the advanced industrialized 
nations had made great technological strides to flie benefit of their economies, there were 
also improvements made in the humanities, such as improvements in education and 
medical care, which are not always reflected on economic charts. The fact that the world 
was progressing in terms of efficient communications and information systems could no 
longer be ignored by the Soviet government Gorbachev's call for glasnost can be 
evaluated as his awareness of the demands for global economic competition, but his 
refusal to view honestly Ihe damage that inadequate Party politics had wrought on the 
morale of Soviet society led to serious confrontations after glasnost was formally 
condoned. 
Shane's accoimt e^lains the contradictions that Gorbachev faced in the mid-eighties 
as he tried to reconcile Soviet style socialism values witfi the need for progressive 
democracy in opening the chatmels of information. According to Shane, Gorbachev 
made the following remarks: 
'Glasnost,' he said on his Siberian tour in the autumn of 1988, 'is necessary. But 
it must be based on our values. It must be everything that serves socialism and 
serves the people.' A^in, a coi^le of weeks later, addressing top editors and 
broadcast executives, he seemed to be speaking in oxymorons: 'Publish 
everything. There must be plurality of opinions. But plurality aimed at defending 
and strengthening the line of perestroika and the cause of socialism. . . .We are 
not talking about any kind of limits on glasnost and democracy. What limits? 
Glasnost in the interest of the people and of socialism should be without limits. I 
repeat—in the interests of the people and of socialism. 
Shane goes on to explain tiiat flie Party had approved of glasnost only in terms of 
strengthening the Party principles of commimism, a position that Lenin had initiated after 
Shane, Dismantling Utopia. 66. 
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taking power in 1917. Consequently, Gorbachev too, relied on the Leninist ^iproach to 
glasnost in a socialist society. The defining issue for Crorbachev was that the Leninist 
approach used to create Ifae Party autocracy never called for democracy. The term 
democracy, used in context with glasnost, implied fi^edoms and rights that the Soviet 
population had always desired as far as communication of information was concerned. 
When Gorbachev used tihe term "democracy" to e?qplain the premise that glasnost was 
founded on, the Party was in effect relinquishing tfie specificity of definition which had 
traditionally accompanied glasnost, as public opinion that existed within the law. 
By 1988, glasnost had released enough information to exact a decisive impact 
throughout the Soviet Unioa The contention became apparent as glasnost gaiited power 
among the people, displacing the Party in power. Consequently, while glasnost was 
lifting the silence that had shrouded the nation, Ck)ibachev became increasingly alarmed 
at llie results glasnost was piroducing. Shane describes an exasperated Goibachev who 
realized by 1991 that glasnost was spinning out of control, by his standards. The Party 
was not used to being upstaged in terms of authority, and glasnost had accomplished an 
eradication of the Party's autiiority in three years time. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
PARADOX 
biformation Revolution and the Liberalization of Society 
When Gorbachev employed the use of glasnost to challenge the Party's inadequate 
administration, the availability of information continued to be controlled. Until 
glasnost, tiie Party measured the availability of information in the Soviet Union, 
filtering, isolating, and distributing on a "need to know basis." As described by 
Shane throughout his book, Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet 
Union, the majority of Soviet citizens were duped for decades into acceptance of a 
narrow perspective that hig^ghted only that w^ch the Party deemed to be of 
importance, and, as a consequence, that which depicted the Party most favorably. 
It was the literal definition of glasnost that betrayed the Party, a truth ^t 
Gorbachev could not reconcile with his call for upgraded socialism in a nation 
dominated by a single Party leadership. Glasnost, defined as openness, or publicity, 
literally took into account eveiy individual's perspective and opinion. As Gorbachev 
recoimts in Memoirs: 
Thanks to glasnost, perestroika began to find an increasingly broad social 
base. It is difiicult to overestimate the importance of this... .Freedom of 
speech made it possible to go over the heads of the apparatchiks and turn 
directly to flie people, to give them the incentive to act and win tiieir 
siq)port... .CHasnost was a powerful weapon, and people soon realized it 
Although Gorbachev reconunended the use of glasnost, hoping for a stronger Party 
presence in an economically improved nation, the people were the ones that 
implemented the reform to its lull capability. As soon as glasnost was condoned by 
Gorbachev, the reform took off on its own course primarily because glasnost included 
the people and was no longer limited to exclusive Party participation. 
The ironic consequences glasnost delivered upon the Soviet Union came about 
because, "Gorbachev's experiment with information produced. . .a revolution, thus 
proving fatal to his Party, his country, and his own political career."^ The factors that 
proved to be most contradictoiy centered around Gorbachev's insistence that glasnost 
was devoted to the Party principle and also to the truth. Those factors proved to be a 
combustible combination that e^loded in Gorbachev's Kremlin within months of the 
implementation of glasnost. 
hi the avalanche of information that poured out of tiie Soviet Union, the most 
damaging truth of all asserted that the Party was grossly corrupt and had mismanaged 
the affairs of the Soviet entire. From the centralized economy of the Soviet Union to 
the societal infrastructure, the Party had dominated the system in a vigilant and 
authoritarian manner. Unfortunately, by the time glasnost came into practice, the 
system was at a stage of decay, the result of an antiquated Party policy concerning 
information. The ironic consequences which awaited the Party, and Gorbachev, was 
that the information which the Party had guarded for decades in order to keep power 
was strangling the life out of the Soviet Union. No aspect had been left untouched by 
' Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York; Doubleday, 1995), 303/207. 
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the untruths the Party held up to the public as reality Glasnost truly did let in the 
light, as Gorbachev had desired, but the shadows that appeared fell the darkest around 
the Communist Party. 
According to Shane, "[tjhe death of the Soviet illusion, for most people, took place 
between 1987 and 1991—^an astonishly rapid demise... .and there are no real 
historical precedents."^ Shanes's information, acquired through polling results 
conducted by the first organization to study public opinion in the Soviet Union, 
measures tiie extent to which the population was affected by glasnost. The results 
show a steady decline in the legitimacy factor of the nation's government, falling 
from a 25 percent lack of trust as of December 1989, to nearly 70 percent rejection of 
Party politics in July 1991. As Shane emphasizes, it was not an onslau^t of tanks 
and bombs which destroyed the credibility of the Party but an onslaught of 
information.'* As glasnost began to take effect, revitalizing tiie citizens to begin 
participating in the renewal process just as Gorbachev requested, information became 
available fhat challenged die Party's ideological structure. 
By 1987 the Party was called upon to account for events, long passed in Soviet 
history, but which continued to be a source of pain for many members of the 
population. The most aching remnant of Soviet history was undoubtedly Stalinism, a 
time that scarred the nation by developing a mentality of shame and fear. Shane gives 
a compelling account of the "restoration of history" in the Soviet Union particularly 
^ Scott Shane, Dismantling Utopia: How Infonnation Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago; Ivan R. Dee, 
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underscoring Ihe tragedy of Stalin's totalitarianism as an era which "had torn the 
country's heart out in the late 1930's"^ As a result of glasnost, an abundance of 
information revealed the horrors of Stalinism, painting a shocking picture of rape and 
ruin of an entire population under one phobic dictatorship. Beginning with the murder 
of the Romanov family in 1918, the list of terror accumulated wifli glasnost including 
the assassination of Sei^ei Kirov vy^ch touched off the Great Purges, the execution 
of Nikolai Bukharin and other Bolsheviks, hi addition, tiiousands of Red Army 
ofiGcers and citizens began to be accounted for according to the principle of glasnost, 
not flie Party. The truth which Gorbachev had heralded as the Soviet's epiphany, 
spoke not of heroic conquests under Stalin's leadership, but rather a concerted effort 
by the government to master a situation of terrorization against the citizens. 
More importantly, &e violations that occurred in the illusion of creating a socialist 
Utopia were silenced at the expense of the people, denying them openness of 
communications and the right to information. Even more disturbing were the efforts 
of the Party to cover up the truth of Stalin's crimes and the perpetuation of the Soviet 
illusion under waves of Party manufactured propaganda. When Gorbachev chose to 
implement glasnost, he had absorbed enough Party pragmatism to make him 
confident that Party objectives were legitimately concerned with the betterment of 
society. Information proved differently. 
The information which poured into the Soviet Union after glasnost arrived 
amounted to a diverse array of subjects, from Ihe literary arts to economics to sex. 
^Ibid., 126. 
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The circulation of information consumed society. The Soviets were hungry for a 
difference of perspective, a sincere re-telling of historical events, and a new brand of 
entertainment that exhilarated the public. The infonnation that now made its debut in 
the Soviet newspapers, magazines, and on radio and television broadcasts had already 
been received in the West as a result of publication legalities. Yet, flie Soviet 
audience embraced this "new" information with a passion tiiat exceeded the degree of 
interest that &e same literature had received with its initial publications in the West. 
According to Shane, the Soviet Union held the leading position as publisher of books, 
but the content was dictated by the Party standards and, unfortunately for the Party, 
"not what people wanted."® As Gorbachev had guessed, the people were most hun^ 
for &e truth, as evidenced by the tremendous response glasnost brought to Soviet 
publications and broadcasts. 
The ironic part of the equation was that Gorbachev missed the impact that glasnost 
would cany on the population in terms of the "demand economics" so prevalent in 
the capitalistic countries. In fact, the population energetically consumed information 
such as book publications just released from censorship, Solzhenitsyn's Gulag 
Archipelago and Boris Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago. Television broadcasts catered 
exclusively to topics of public interest, with programs such as Leningrad's Public 
Opinion and in Moscow, Vzglvad. or the View, retaining a major audience. In 
addition weekly publications noted tremendous increases in subscriptions as a result 
of provocative stories and articles that fired the interests of the people. According to 
® Ibid, 184. 
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Isaac J. Tarasulo, the magazine, Qgonvok. doubled its subscriptions from 561,415 
in 1987 to 1,313,349 and the total periodical increase in the Soviet Union was over 18 
million by 1987.^ The most con^elling part of the increase in the circulations 
revolves around content The information available was satisfying the need for 
diverse information that was not approved of before glasnost 
Shane notes that die periodical Druzhba Narodov ran a serialization of Anatoly 
Rybakov's Children of the Arbat which takes place just before Stalin began his 
puiging campaign. The circulation of the periodical increased by seven times as 
much before Rybakov's story appeared. Not only celebrated authors were published. 
Shane chronicles the work of a fifty plus broadcast journalist who pursued the truth 
concerning the whereabouts of executed victims during Stalin's crimes. Alexander 
Milchakov conducted his own interviews, collecting information, compiling 
witnesses testimonies to the tragedies committed by Soviets against oflier Soviets. 
Wittiout access to archives Kfilchakov produced an expose, published in the 
September 1988 journal Sem'ia. or Family, entitled Ashes of the Executed, that not 
only described the events of Stalinism but indicated approximate burial places where 
the remains of the victims were unceremoniously buried. By 1988 the KGB 
conceded to Milchakov's vigilance and produced information from Soviet archives 
disclosing Ihe names and fates of executed citizens. Shane describes the in:^)act of 
information as singularly creating an information industry that quickly toppled the 
Party press, Pravda. and its affiliate broadcasting network, Vremva. 
Now Marx's dictum that imder commimism the state would wither away 
appeared to be working in reverse: as Communist ideology shriveled, so did 
^ Isaac J. Tarasulo, ed., Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press ( Wilmington, 
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the totalitarian state. It was butting out of people's lives, no longer telling 
tfxem vdiat to think, where to work, vviioni to vote for, vsiiom to hate... .A 
new popular culture was bom, and people who were not caught up directly in 
pK)litics, whether their interest was Orthodox liturgy, rock music, or sexual 
techniques, became beneficiaries of glasnost^ 
The democratization of Soviet society involved a diversity of material made available 
to £q)peal to many different personal preferences. Glasnost escaped the Party line of 
restricted information because differences existed among the public, and glasnost's 
pubUc consciousness proved to be stronger than the single-minded communist 
consciousness that the Par^ insisted was the truth. 
Plurahty of tastes and opinions, and of thoughts and attitudes emerged with 
glasnost, and the people embraced die refreshing divergence. Again Shane has 
documented the response of Soviet citiz^s who drank in glasnost, among them 82 
year old Maria Andreyeva whose comments epitomize the impact that glasnost had: 
'Ogonyok used to lie around at the hairdresser's [and]. . . Now the whole 
coimtry reads it. Korotich has uncovered all kinds of evUdoing by Stalin. 
He's telling us the tnith.' Maria Andreyeva was.. .old enough to remember 
the Revolution and to have cast her meaningless vote in dozens of 
meaningless elections. 'You know what's good?' she said. 'These people 
aren't standing in line for sugar, not for bread, not for meat. They're standing 
in line for ideas.'' 
Another recollection comes from Vitaly Korotich, the editor of Ogonvok who 
explained "in a 1988 television appearance 'For me, glasnost is simply a return to tiie 
norm,' The response to glasnost was deafening not only because the information 
that was available came from the public, but also because the Party resistance to 
public disclosure increased glasnost's value tremendously. Once the process of 
«Ibid., 185. 
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liberalization began, it was impossible to stop because freedom of expression in 
society became not only necessary to heal but to progress. 
Power Politics and the End of the Soviet Union 
At the point of realization that glasnost was breaking from his intended course, 
Gorbachev began to recant his reform policy, calling for an adherence to the Leninist 
principle. Because, as Doder and Branson recognize in their account of glasnost, 
Gorbachev perceived his power as initiating reform from above and below witii no 
accountability, he also regarded popular response to fall in line with the Soviet 
political agenda of perestroika and reject any deviation as a matter of Soviet socialist 
principle, Leninism. Gorbachev's position reflected the Party perspective, vigilantly 
protecting Party interests of power. Contraiy to Gorbachev's position, under glasnost 
the revolution from below not only rejected the Party's political agenda but its entire 
operation precisely, as a matter of democratic principle. 
The critical eye of glasnost settled finally on the Communist Party, and what was 
revealed was disagreeable to tiie population that was experiencing a resurgence of 
freedoms. As Doder and Branson succinctly e^lain, " Only after Gorbachev's 
glasnost did the public begin to face the facts: that the Soviet way of life was 
miserable.. .and that the Party was losing its sense of direction and purpose."" The 
damning evidence was contained in information tiiat glasnost held up for pubUc 
scrutiny, and within months the Party was under a persistent and wide-spread attack 
because it had assumed to know all of the answers to the economic, ideological, 
''Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Penguin Books, 
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philosophical, and political directions a communist nation should follow. The Party 
had endowed itself with absolute knowledge and absolute power witiiin the system. 
With the effects of glasnost spreading rapidly throughout the Soviet Union, the Party 
had to face absolute consequences of its socioeconomic policies. As a result of 
political authority that for decades rejected democratic practices to maintain power, 
Gorbachev and the Party were faced witti an admission of guilt in executing an 
ideological premise that deviated in practice to become a full blown e?q)loitation of 
the masses. No greater evidence of such exploitation was required than the 
information that glasnost produced. 
The Constitution of the USSR, legislated in 1936, stated that freedom of speech, 
the press, of assembly, and other communications were expressly guaranteed by the 
law. Glasnost revealed another truth to the Soviet citizens who for decades believed 
that their personal freedoms were genuine and protected. Instead, with ^e 
implementation of glasnost, a different truth emerged that exposed the Party as 
negligent in upholding democratic rights. 
That Stalin was guilty of mass executions of his population in the cause of 
exterminating the "enemies of the people" was no longer a shocking admittance to 
many who had read personal accounts through samizdat sources or had relatives that 
lived through the terror. The (Usturbing trend that persisted was that the Party 
leadership under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chemenko, and Gorbachev 
continued to grasp onto the idea that the Party was on course with the Marxist-
Leninist principle and advocated sincere democratic socialism in tiie nation. 
However, as Shane, Doder, Branson, and even Gorbachev relate in their publications, 
the ideal was one formed in error from tiie conception of the Communist Party. The 
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credibility of the Communist Party was challenged by a careful examination of the 
methods that were an actuality in the political system and then reforms, such as 
glasnost, that illuminated the necessity for democratic means. Gorbachev comments 
on Ae transition that the Party underwent when faced with glasnost's plurality of 
consciousness; 
After the l" Congress of People's Deputies, power began to pass to the 
Soviets. The Party, as is proper in a democratic society, would no longer 
direct the nation's development and had to begin operating by political means. 
.. -Thus began the most difGcult stage for the Parly—in which it sought its 
place in a society that was renewing itself. 
Gorbachev points out that the Party recognized the time for change by the time his 
reforms were initiated. Yet, the critical realization revolved around the reconciliation 
between the Party that had occupied the central position in socioeconomic affairs with 
the society who, as Grorbachev emphasizes, found themselves in a revolution against 
the Party autiiority for mismanagement of socioeconomics and politics. 
The fact that tfie Soviet Union had no plurality divisions in its poUtical system 
made the Party particularly vulnerable, being the onty accountable entity for the state 
of affairs in all areas of the nation that were increasingly coming under review by the 
press and broadcasters. Instead of basking in the light of benevolence that Gorbachev 
had anticipated, as he delivered his seventieth-aimiversary speech for the October 
Revolution in Red Square, November of 1987, a curious defection began among the 
Party apparatus itself. 
Particularly troubling for Gorbachev, who extolled the virtues of Leninism during 
the bulk of his anniversaiy speech, was the fact that glasnost's effect had splintered 
Gorbachev, Memoirs. 350. 
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the govenunent into factions that conducted polemical arguments now in full piiblic 
view. Doder and Branson comments that: 
With glasnost blooming as never before, the entire cotmtry seemed to have 
become a vast debating society. From the point of view of the Brezhnev era, 
the Soviet Union was in the gr^ of an almost subversive spirit, lacking in due 
respect for Bolshevik propositions, and toying with dissident ideas for which 
people only a few years earlier were sentenced to long prison terms." 
Gorbachev embraced the new sense of political participation in the nation, but widi 
reservations. When the issue of territorial security came to the fore with nationality 
upheavals in parts of Central Asia and the Baltics, Gorbachev pretended not to notice 
the issue of self-determination to which glasnost had led. 
The fact that the Soviet Union encompassed eleven time zones and 110 ethnic 
groups presented a crucial consideration to the Party's political stance. A one-party 
system that advocated a single ideological commitment could not practice glasnost's 
democratization without facing one very important fact. Not eveiyone believed in 
Leninism as profoundly as the Party expected, and when it came to politics, the Party 
had to force allegiance to the communist objective, as demonstrated by the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956 or the 1968 Prague Spring. 
Gorbachev had expressly refused to employ force when he initiated his reforms, 
as Doder and Branson argue, because he was trying to avoid cotmections with 
Stalinism in power politics. However, as a result of Leninism, Gorbachev was faced 
with trying to sell the idea that commimism was advantageous to republics that had 
been brutally imperialized by flie Soviet power. EEs argument fell on deaf ears aid 
consequently provided a springboard for the republics to declare their independence 
" Doder and Branson. Goibadiev: Heretic in the Kremlin. 315. 
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from the USSR. The most prevalent theme in the nationality urgency became a 
recognition by Gorbachev fliat truth did not ultimately lay at the feet of Lenin and the 
Party he created in Russia. The crisis that loomed before the Soviet leader is 
succinctly characterized in Doder and Branson's analysis: 
Here was the central paradox of Gorbachev's rule—the more he sought to 
disburse power, the more he found it necessary to concentrate power in his 
own hands... .He was trying, as Sakharov chided him publicly, "to get a 
democratic process through undemocratic me^is."" 
The democratic factors of openness and public interaction that accompanied glasnost 
mixed badly wi& the authoritarian realities of Soviet politics, a combination that 
literally exploded Gorbachev's idealism of commimist destiny. 
John ]Vfiller offers an interpretation concerning Gorbachev's position that also 
illustrates the contradictions present between the Party otgective of socialist equality 
and the democracy foimd in glasnost. Specifically, Miller points to the emergence of 
(he Soviet middle class who required "support in finding an independent voice, a 
new role that was politically democratic in nature. As Miller goes on to explain, the 
consequences of new and independent voices in the public forum heralded a plurality 
of interests not only among the society but among the govermnent officials as well. 
Essentially glasnost slipped from a reform that was fashioned to advance 
socioeconomics without disrupting the political principles upon which the Party was 
erected. By the time Gorbachev realized tiie dissension that was emerging within tiie 
Parly infrastructure, he became defiant, but glasnost's energy had become a fact of 
Soviet life. 
Ibid., 353/4. 
John Miller, Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), 
108. 
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The establishment of the Congress of People's Deputies by Sakharov and Boris 
Yeltsin created a parliamentary structure that consisted of both non-communist and 
communist members and which defined the break from single Party politics. The 
presence of Yeltsin profoimdly disturbed the stability of Party politics for one very 
inqjortant reason—a rejection of commimist identification that was so integral in the 
founding and consolidation of the Party for decades. Doder and Branson relate an 
incident in vi^ch Yeltsin publicly declared himself a socialist democrat to which 
Gorbachev resixmded, shortly after, that he was a dedicated communist. The incident 
depicts the spUt of identities and opinions accompanying glasnost and also illustrates 
the necessity for a forum to air constructively such differences. Gorbachev's 
response to Yeltsin's declaration began a struggle within the Party apparatus that 
ultimately escalated tensions until, as Miller accounts, Gorbachev foimd himself at 
&e epicenter of three distinct competitive forces—^the military, Yeltsin's Russian 
administration, and the non-Russian republics. 
The coup of August 1991 relegated the position of Gorbachev, as President of the 
CPSU engaging reform meant to stimulate the Soviet socioeconomic position, to one 
that reflected the growing frustration among the population that was publicly 
dissenting against the Party form of sociopolitical administration. Increasingly 
Gorbachev clashed with the splintering effects brought about through glasnost 
primarily because he was a dedicated communist and could not fathom any deviation 
from Party supremacy in political affairs. Even as Gorbachev sought a reconciliation 
to the nuclear conflict of the Cold War, the prevailing conflict existed within his own 
national borders, a conflict of social principles that he had initiated when he called for 
glasnost. 
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The coup ultimately illustrated the deep riit between the old ^lard, Brezhnevites 
that yearned for the stability that controlled information brought to society, and tiiie 
radicals led by Yeltsin that defied the system's defects, openly, as glasnost allowed, 
fronically, Gforbachev was caught in the middle of the rift, betrayed by his commimist 
colleagues that had staged the coi^, and rescued by Yeltsin, the political '̂ ew 
thinker" in the Kremlin who had publicly renounced conmiunism as a ''dream beyond 
the clouds,"a remark met with disapproval by Gorbachev who viewed flie 
rebellious nature of Yeltsin as a threat to the stability of the socialist system and 
communist ideology. Another ironic development, as Shane presents, is that 
Goibachev kept informed throughout the coup by means of foreign broadcasts, BBC, 
Voice of America, and Radio Liberty while Soviet audiences were entertained with 
classical music performances for hours. Glasnost had not failed the Soviet leader 
during the political showdown with Party hardliners yet glasnost did fail to revitalize 
the Party as Gorbachev had hoped. Instead, as a consequence of glasnost, the Party 
was challenged openly to be politically accountable for the myths under which the 
Soviet socioeconomic system operated. The coi^ was not the Party's shining 
moment to re-engage control of infonnation which in effect would control the 
population once again. Glasnost had denied that possibility to the Party, and the coup 
of August 1991 was played out on a world stage as testimony to the impact that 
glasnost produced in the Soviet Union. 
Shane, Dismantiing Utopia, 240. 
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Irreconcilable Differences: Why Democracy Survived and 
The Communist Party Fell From Power 
The lack of democracy in the Soviet Union was apparent for two reasons, the 
refusal of the Party to incorporate civil liberties for fear of disintegrating political 
power and &e covert actions in v^ch the population engaged, in an effort to have a 
voice. Pnmarily, the measures that the Commimist Party engaged in to control the 
population's resources of information resulted in a backlash against die government 
once glasnost was permitted to exist The right to information faced a peculiar 
interpretation according to Soviet legislation which convoluted all forms of 
information. Most notably was the introduction in the nation of a state censorship 
bureau, Glavlit, or the Chief Administration for matters of Literature and Publishing, 
that was established in June 6, 1931. Glavlit embodied the Party's objective to secure 
every form of information imder legal statute, thus ensuring control over the 
population in matters of artistic ejqpression, education, and virtually every type of 
communication. 
In addition to the institution of controlled information, the Party legislated Articles 
70, 190-1 and 190-3 on September 16, 1966, which placed punishment upon those 
engaging in anti-Soviet informatiott With the KGB acting as protectorate of Party 
interests the population had no choice but to take illegal communication undergroimd, 
and the birth of samizdat opposed Glavlit in terms of disseminating information. The 
fact that the Party consistently diverted freedom of communication and the right to 
information in legal constraints illustrate die insecurity that was a factor in the Party. 
Ironically, the Party feared the exact force that brought the Bolsheviks to power, and 
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to ccHnbat future insuirection the Party resorted to repression of the same resources 
that Lenin utilized. 
During the 1905 Revolution in Tsarist Russia Lenin commented on the great 
advantages gained throu^ public discourse, the liberty of &e press to disseminate 
information, and the educational communication to fiirdier critical mindedness. Yet, 
after the Revolution of 1917 brou^t an end to the old order, information tfiat was 
previously viewed as valuable was now interpreted against the new regime. The 
point was well taken because, as Shane suggests, Party loyalists opposed glasnost 
precisely because of the damage information could bring against the Party. 
Gorbachev, on the other hand, had a blind-sighted belief in the tenets of socialism 
and especially in Leninist socialism. Yet his belief existed for him, as a Party 
member, in an isolated world where Party members received the rights denied to 
other members of society. For decades the other members of society desired the 
opportunity to voice an opinion, to publish a piece of work that reflected a unique 
point of tfaou^t, or to engage conversation around an issue of personal importance. 
The evidence of persecution against Soviet people \i*^o attempted to communicate 
naturally is well documented and disturbing. 
Airing an opinion that fell from Party mentality cost greatly in terms of himian 
integrity. Such intolerance is heavily chronicled in Reddaway's work on participants 
in the Democratic Movement and the distribution of samizdat publications. Those 
who were punished for taking part in an exchange of information or in speaking out 
for civil liberties were dealt harshly with by the regime. The nature of Soviet society 
was always to communicate freely and without fear, but the nature of the Party was 
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always to preserve power even if lliat involved subjecting the population to 
governing authority because the Party violated fundamental rig|hts from the 
beginning. 
The language of the dissident reflects the absence of democracy in the Soviet 
Union just as the language of authority reflects the absence of democracy within the 
Party. the case of celebrated dissidents Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel in 
1966, a plea made by Sinyavsky to the Soviet courts illustrates the degree of 
frustration at the lack of democracy in the system. 
The aiguments which have been flung at me are such that it is impossible to 
explain anything.... 'Where are your positive heroes? Ah, you haven't got 
any! Ah you are not a socialist! Ah, you are not a realist! Ah, you are not a 
Marxist! Ah, you are afantaisiste and an idealist, and you publish abroad into 
the bai:gain! Of course you are a coimterrevolutionary!'̂ ^ 
Having to defend themselves for writing literature tiiat came under tiie interpretation, 
by the Party, as anti-Soviet demonstrates flie lack of democracy. Under the Party 
standards only propaganda was accorded ri^ts of publication and circulation, a 
blatantly biased position tiiat exhibits no tolerance for any differit^ thou^t or 
expression. Yet tiie Party's idea of freedom of commimication can be found 
succinctly stated in Article 109 of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR which states 
that freedom of speech, the press, of assembly, and of demonstrations are permitted as 
a fimdamental civil rigjit. fronically, the timing of such legislation coincided with 
Stalin's purges, which obliterated not only basic rights but human dignity. 
When Gorbachev spoke of the need for democratization in the nation, he was 
aware, as all Pioty members, of the gross violations of rights under Party government. 
" Zigurds L. Zile, Ideas and Forces in Soviet Legal History: A Reader on the Soviet State and Law 
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1992), 418. 
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In Memoirs, Gorbachev recounts the words of a speech delivered to the XXVnilh 
Congress in which calls attention to the discrepancies in the system and the need for 
change—political, economic, and ideological Such words from the Soviet General 
Secretary points to &e recognition that a lack of democracy existed before glasnost 
and continued to exist then. Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956 accounts for the 
recognition fliat democracy was not present during Stalinism. Lideed, the absence of 
democracy is evidenced in 1921 wdien Kronstadt Insrirgents documented displeasure 
with the new regime; 
After carrying out the October revolution, the working class had hoped to 
achieve its emancipation. But the result was an even greater enslavement of 
the human personality. The power of the police and gendarme monarchy 
passed into the hands of the Communist usurpers, who, instead of giving the 
people freedom, instilled in them constant fear of falling into the torture 
chambers of the Cheka, vdiich in their horrors far exceed the gendarme 
administration of the tsarist regime. The b^onets, bullets, and gruff 
conmiands of the Cheka oprichniki—^these are what the workingman of 
Russia has won after so much struggle and suffering.. .. 
But most infamous and criminal of all is the moral servitude which the 
Commimists have inaugurated: diey have laid their hands on the iimer world 
of the toilers, forcing them to think in the Communist way... .Having gained 
power, it is only afraid of losing it, and therefore deems every means 
permissible.. 
The declaration emphasizes the character of the Party as powermongers, uninterested 
in the plight of the working masses, however, it also underscores the lack of 
democratic treatment in a system ^t was founded on a socialist democratic principle 
devoted to upholding the rights of the working class. 
The truth, which Grorbachev stressed in Perestroika as so urgently required for the 
rescue of the system, was that democracy never existed in the Party in any form, 
bouigeois to socialist, and in fact the communist ideal denied democratic rights as a 
Ibid., 140. 
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way to secure political power. The lack of democratic ri^ts was never so apparent 
as in the documents of writers that were denied pubhcation because the material 
displeased the Party. The truth, provided by glasnost, failed to consolidate the Soviet 
system because glasnost actually provided democratization in the fonn of information 
liberties and the Party could not endure the content of infoimation that poured from 
the population. 
In many respects glasnost was democratization for the people because it allowed a 
valuable resource to communicate information without fear of persecution. Had the 
Parly been democratic in nature, it would have been flexible enough to weigh other 
opinions in the spirit of participation. Gorbachev initially welcomed the advantage 
glasnost was to bring to his nation. By the time tiie truth was revealed, the leader 
shrank from the reform to rally the people to engage in thinking that was typical for 
sociaUst enhancement. Shane comments that the most notable contradiction was that 
Gorbachev's ideal of socialism was utopi^m in nature and escaped tiie reality of the 
system Lenin had created. Lenin's system was void of democracy from the 
beginning, because vdien actual democratic reform came to tiie Soviet Union the 
nation ceased to exist. 
The fact that Lenin had come to power illegitimately in 1917 and perpetuated the 
idea of revolution to a communist Utopia eliminated public participation because 
Lenin, by reasoning of Marxism, had arrived at all of the answers relevant to the 
Soviet population. Lenin's specialty, like Marx and Engels, was revolution and 
economics. However, economics does not produce a complete system. The need for 
participation in terms of thou^t brings progress to society, ^d when thought is 
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Strangled for the good of the system, then one is left with stagnation, as Gorbachev 
encountered, of a system that will never move forward. 
Notable to the definition of what constitutes democratization in a system is John 
Stuart Mill's theory concerning liberty. Mill contends that the pohtical order is 
responsible for preventing vice and promoting virtue and the best means for assuring 
such a combination comes tiirou^ law, criminal and civil, and public opinion. '̂ Law 
exists as a tangible measure of permissible and impermissible, where public opinion 
exists as the intangible element that reflects society's moral standard. Free 
expression is powerful because it allows a continuum of thought and ideas. The idea 
of progress as an evolutionary process of education and development requires new 
thought and ideas in order to be productive. Therefore, as MiU suggests, free 
expression is required for the privileges it bestows on society just as law is required to 
protect those privileges. 
Goihachev's understanding of democracy, while flawed, was certainly well 
intended. In reviewing the former Soviet leader's convictions on the socialist 
principle, he exhibits unfailing confidence in the system and in the future of his 
nation. It is an ironic convergence that both Lenin and Gorbachev use the wcn-d 
democracy yet have no real understanding of what democratic rights encompass. 
According to Volkogonov's analysis of Lenin, the founder of the Communist Party 
had little comprehension of democracy. In the same vein Doder and Branson remark 
that Grorbachev paid lip service to democracy in speeches and in publications yet note 
" John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New Yoric: TTie Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), 64. 
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that '̂ ese ri^ts and freedoms were debated in the context of economic reform... 
Gorbachev does not speak of liberty in his book, and he rarely mentions individual 
li^ts."^" The irony is that both the founder and the final Soviet Union leader did not 
recognize die necessity for individual freedom, a cornerstone of democracy. 
The necessity of democracy in ^e context of glasnost, free e^ession, is best 
e7q>lained according to Mill's theory concerning individual liberties within the 
society. Mill speaks to the necessity of a "moral compact" between tiie individual 
and society as a way to balance the interests of both. If society is allowed to repress 
the individual Ihrou^ laws, progress is hampered. By the same token if individuals 
have no allegiance to the good of the society in which they live, progress is also 
hampered. Thus, it is according to a moral standard, or law, that individuals should 
conduct themselves in their society. The moral standard is established according to 
mutual values which will benefit both the individual as well as the society. As for the 
role of society in the compact contends; 
[L]et not society pretend that it needs.. .the power to issue conunands and 
enforce obedience in the personal concerns of individuals in which, on all 
principles of justice and policy, the decision ought to rest witii those who are 
to abide the consequences.. .it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit 
and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority and do with 
ostentation tiie exact opposite of vy^t it enjoins. 
Mill's argument for the moral compact illustrates the necessity for democratic 
liberties in the interest of social progress because the pursuit for truth is an ongoing 
process and is necessary for progression. 
Doder and Branson, Goibadiev: Heretic in the Kremlin. 251. 
'̂MiU. On Liberty. 101. 
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In contrast to ^/fill's theory regarding democracy, Gorbachev submits his own 
interpretation of the process of democratization. It is interesting that Gkvbachev also 
views the moral standard as imperative, commenting that the "moral aspect is of 
tremendous importance."^^ The defining difference in Gorbachev's interpretation of 
democracy resides in his perspective that the Party must conduct the society and the 
individuals according to Soviet socialist objectives, such an qjproach, 
Gorbachev still regarded tiie Party as integral in directing the citizens according to 
socialist principles. The liberty to act independently from the government as 
individuals determined, particularly in areas such as freedom of speech, of the press, 
or right to assembly, was considered counter to the socialist premise of collective 
effort in the Soviet UniotL 
It must be noted then that Lenin had instilled in the Party a vanguard mentality 
that the commimist ideology was the ultimate truth. Consequently, commimism not 
only supplied an end result for everyone, regardless of diversity in thought or opinion, 
but through the use of terror enforced the submission to the communist objective. 
Lenin also suggested that "democratic centralism" be instituted in the Party vanguard 
as a way to facilitate a forum for opposition where discourse could occur between the 
two levels of govenmient concerning issues and, after suitable dialogue, a decision 
would be ultimately reached by the higher Party conunittee. Democratic centralism, 
as Lenin's pre-revolutionaiy notion of social democracy, was non-existent in practice. 
Lenin's legacy to the Party held no democratic credibility, a position that was 
unenviable when Gorbachev called for democratization in tiie use of glasnost. 
^ Mikhail S.Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Hiinkiiig for Our Country and the Worid (New Yoric: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1987), 103. 
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Speaking of the need for glasnost in the media Gorbachev commented diat 
"[cjriticism can be an effective instrument of perestroika only if it is based on 
absolute truth and scrupulous concern for justice."^^ Ironically, wh^ Gk>ibachev 
urged truth in glasnost, the incorporation of public participation in submitting 
opinions and engaging in debate, he unwitting was engaging democratization by 
acknowledging the legitimate need for individuals and society to have the freedom to 
communicate. At &e same time, Gorbachev sounded the death knell for the Party 
v^o had restricted personal liberties for the sake of the political authority, but 
Gorbachev's decision to initiate glasnost was a testament to his belief in the virtues of 
democracy, aside from his nation's communist history. Gorbachev's realization that 
the society was faltering signaled his desire to reconcile individual interests with that 
of society and the state. However, (Gorbachev's priority in introducing refonn was to 
bolster the state and societal structure together without giving credibility to the 
participation of the individual. Clearly, the contradiction for Gorbachev revolved 
around the society and the individual. 
Mill argues tiiat it is better for the whole of society if the individual prospers 
without interference from the government, suggesting that: 
The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of 
individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when instead 
of informing, advising, and upon occasion, denouncing it makes them work in 
fetters.. .The worth of a State, in flie long run, is the worth of the individuals 
composing it; and a State vdiich postpones the interests of their mental 
e?q)ansion and elevation to a little more of administrative skiU. . .will find that 
with small men no great thing can really be accomplished.^ 
Ibid,79. 
^ Mill. On Liberty. 140/1. 
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Gorbachev's task, to bring democratic procedure into the public forum, was 
complicated by his insistence that the socialist truth was absolute, and that the country 
could indeed prosper under a system that was grossly lacking in political plurality. In 
point of fact the Party fliat Lenin had brought to power knew only control throu^ top 
down force \^ch was plainly undemocratic. 
The reaction to glasnost was a contradiction to Parly policy as evidenced by 
Gorbachev's recanting of his reform. Shane contends that by 1991 Gorbachev "had 
dramatically retreated from reform,because he witnessed the contradictions to his 
original goals. The fact that the Party tumbled from power in the face of the illegal, 
and ill-fated, attempted coiip illustrates the power fliat glasnost had effected. Soviet 
politics could not continue as a single-Party system governing a society that desired 
the democratic value of pluralism in politics and society. 
^ Shane, Disniantling Utopia:How Information Ended the Soviet Union. 248. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Examitiing Ifae sociopolitical course that Russia has taken, it is evident that 
Kavelin's state school theory is valid. Russia iinited folly under the Tsardom 
instituted with Ivan IE, extending the ruling order to the fated 20*'" centuiy when the 
Romanov's were finally eradicated in 1918. The Tsarist form of government 
accomplished two objectives, to unify Russia under a nationalist banner and establish 
a i^stem ^t left little opportunity for opposition, externally and intemally. 
Consequently, Russia existed as a secured state that could survive intercontinental 
challenges as well as strangling potential discord among the subject population. 
Notably, under the authority of Ivan IV, the role of the Russian population was 
defined according to the needs of the state and also to the whims of the Tsar. 
Yanov's assessment that autocratic will was consolidated with the implementation of 
the Oprichniki e^lains the significance of future control procedures employed by the 
system, tsarist and Soviet. Therefore, the population was not only placed into a social 
role, not of &eir choosing, but prescribed by political rule, and as a response to 
potential opposition the political police assured compliance. Additionally, ^e 
founder of St. Petersburg envisioned a fortress that would serve as protectorate of the 
nation, fortified with military advantage and enforced by means of legalized national 
allegiance. Even though PetCT the Great failed to witness the completion of St. 
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Petersburg, the legacy of his militarization became a cornerstone of future political 
direction in Russia. 
If Ivan IV and Peter I defined the defense system of Russia, their successor 
Catherine the Great defined cultural standards. Emphasizing the Enli^tenment of 
European courts, Empress Catherine paved the way for Russia's participation in the 
flowering era of intellectuals. In particular, the introduction of European 
personalities and cultural diversity, while limited chiefly to the political and social 
elite, significantly changed the landscape of Russian political and social discourse. 
The window to Europe that Peter opened was surely beautified with Catiierine's 
impressive aesthetic contributions, but more important were tiie alternative 
considerations that came alive for Russian enlightened thinkers. In many ways, '̂ ew 
blinking" began under Catherine's rule, yet the Empress cared little for nurturing 
adverse political reactions to her policies concerning ^e social welfare of her 
subjects. 
The theme of individual sacrifice for the stability of the state remained 
indisputable, and particularly those who would challenge the system as inadequate to 
social progress were summarily dismissed. The nationalist identity of Russia by the 
19^ century was unique primarily because the collectivization mentality resisted 
reform that would encourage personal advantage. While men such as Radishchev 
observed injustices present in the sociopolitical structure, the lack of interest by the 
popidation and the elite to redirect changes was an incredible factor in the intellectual 
fi-agility of the nation's system. There was little to gain and much to lose by 
challenging the present order, convoluted as it was, a view vdiich Lincoln stresses in 
his analysis of the enlightened men of pre-revolutionary Russia. 
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By the end of the 19®* century the economic factors came into play, affecting 
not only the masses of peasant and workers but the controlling power as well. 
Althou^ industrialized Europe was engaged in the growing pains of urbanization and 
legislation to accommodate economic progress, Russia continued to survive in the 
tradition of peasant standards—the primary incentive was to merely survive. 
Certainly the conditions that brought Lenin to tiie fore of revolutionaiy activity were 
a mix of rapid disenchantment with living standards and the antiquated system of rule 
that had persisted for centuries. At tiie turn of &e century, the ''enli^tened 
bureaucrats" of Russia still were greatly insignificant and thus unable to be of 
influence to the autocratic order of political power, or to propose more conciliatory 
means than revolution in achieving that same end. 
Certainly the forces against Tsar Nicholas n consisted of a multitude of factors 
brought about external coincidences, the First World War among them. Internally, 
Lenin and the Bolsheviks operated covertly in establishing tiieir Party until political 
factions became legal after tiie Revolution of 1905. At the crossroads, Lenin led the 
revolution into a complete eradication of the Romanovs, subverted political 
opposition from the Mensheviks and the Provisional Goveniment after the February 
Revolution in 1917, and directed an assault in the form of War Commimism against 
the Russian nation in the name of the revolution. In seizing and consolidating power 
Lenin garnered support from those who favored political plurality, the inclusion of 
the worker population in sociopolitical issues, and the peasuits that sought a 
progressive existence and not merely survival. Ironically, the veiy socialist 
revolution which the Bolsheviks, under Lenin's lead, encouraged to displace the 
monarchical order never came to fruition. 
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The reality that accompanied the Communist Party to power in 1918 consisted 
of autocracy, not socialism, and certainly never democracy. It is essential to establish 
that Lenin had little interest in social welfare or in any degree of democratic rights 
and liberties prinfiarily because Gorbachev consistently called on the Leninist 
principles to encourage glasnost and pereslroika. In many ways, this was the ultimate 
contradiction, and one that Gorbachev has never formerly addressed. Why Leninism 
was in line with Gorbachev's democratic socialism theoretically is puzzling in the 
context of Gorbachev's desire for economic and political progression in the Soviet 
Union. As Volkogonov comments: 
To achieve power, the Bolsheviks became wedded forever to violence, while 
liberty was buried in the marriage. Lenin's address 'To the Citizens of 
Russia', following his coup, and his decrees promising peace and land, say 
nothing about liberty as the main aim of the revolution.. .The Russian 
revolution, which formally gave the people peace and land, cunningly 
replaced flie idea of liberty with that of the abolition of the exploitation of man 
by man. Li giving the spectre of hope, Lenin had found and trapped man's 
most robust and vital element, that of failh. He thus condemned the Russians 
for decades to contenting themselves with hope alone. ̂  
From the beginning Lenin operated under the revolutionary banner with no intention 
of allowing political plurality and certainly no civil liberties. Instead tfie mantra of 
the Communist Party became the elimination of the "enemies of the people," but the 
"people," as Gorbachev pointed out after his fall from power, had never been the 
citizens, but the Parly. 
In dismissing the civil liberties that would have been necessary for pr(^essive 
reform, Lenin and the Party erected a poUtical stronghold that carried over the same 
' Dirritri Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 73. 
108 
traditions of autocratic nile from before. The pivotal point was that Lenin, as the 
heir to intelligentsia reform of the IP**" century, utilized the press, assembly, and 
discourse in nations that granted those rights to the public. Lenin advantaged his 
revolutionary position ^ou^ publications of his paper Iskra. or the Spark, which he 
began in London in 1900, and circulated in Russia, albeit covertly. After the 
legislation in 1905, tiie Bolsheviks practiced opposition politics legally, gaining seats 
in the Duma that was instituted under Nicholas U. After the Bolsheviks seized power, 
Lenin continued to publish articles on the Party and communist objectives on an 
international scale. Consequently, the regime overtook any democratic initiatives 
from the Bolsheviks platform of socialist democracy, and directed fiill revolutionary 
energy toward world dominance of the Party. In Russia, renamed the Soviet Union 
after the revolution, the most ftmdamental of personal liberties were extinguished, 
and the Party resorted to the traditional strong-arming policies of political policing to 
guarantee submission. In addition, 1921 communist legislation disallowed factions, 
and in 1918, Glavlit policed public discourse and prohibited written communications 
tiiat led to exchange of information. 
The Party rejected all information that deviated from the socialist objectives of the 
revolution yet the ironic point was that there never existed any form of socialism in 
Soviet Russia from which to deviate. For that reason, it was imperative that the Party 
secure power flirou^ any means possible, including restricting mobilization, and aU 
forms of information found throu^ educational resources as well as common 
communications such as personal conversation. In effect, every avenue that would 
threaten the power of tihie Party was checked and enforcibly controlled. More 
importantly, the same advantages which the Party took to secxire their power, through 
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propagandized information, speeches, and massive campaigns, were denied to the 
rest of the public. 
The crux of the issue was that the repression, which was enforced by the Party, 
portrayed their regime as benevolent and most accommodating to the needs of the 
people. The same policies that Lenin took advantage of to gain revolutionaiy favor 
with the masses, "Land and Bread," served tfie policies of the Party for decades. 
Unfortunately the reality was ^t there never existed a legitimate socialist democratic 
policy to serve the people, and as a consequence, societal ills began to take a toll on 
the nation's economy as well. 
Gorbachev admittedly laid the blame for the sluggish condition of the society and 
economy on the Party apparatus, yet he also clung to the ideal of the Commxmist 
Party instituted under Lenin. Hope was still in the ofGng, as Lenin had led the nation 
to believe, some seventy years earlier. The difference between Gorbachev and Lenin 
was that Gorbachev lived the life of a communist comrade and witnessed first-hand 
tiie lack of motivation, ambition, and resolve that was so needed by the nation if it 
were to survive. Gorbachev, £^ain like his predecessors, insisted the Party was 
capable of elevating socialism to its fullest potential. Unlike Lenin, Gorbachev 
employed democratization to help the process along. 
Glasnost epitomized democratization primarily because it escaped the singular 
control that had defined Party politics, and in fact, most all of Russia's political 
histoiy. The impact of glasnost was twofold—shaking the stability of the Party 
authority and stirring the consciousness of the public to democratic participation. 
Without pubUc opinion the backlash against the Party structure would never have 
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occuired, a consequence which Gorbachev had not considered in his visions for 
Soviet socialism. 
Gorbachev is critically acclaimed to have conceded ultimately to Western 
democratic experiences, especially with the fall of communist centralized planning, 
specifically in terms of economics. True, Gorbachev possessed the foresight to begin 
restrocturing in tiie Soviet Union, but his intention was never to dissolve the political 
epicenter in the nation. According to Gorbachev, the Party remained a viable entity 
that only needed rejuvenating to embrace true Marxism-Leninism. However, glasnost 
rejected the very premise that Lenin's illegitimate seizure of power had begun 
seventy years earlier. In effect, glasnost escaped from its liberator, and Gorbachev 
remains today a victim of his own reform process, a fact which he acknowledges in 
his publications and interviews. 
The absence of pubUc discourse among the Soviet populace magnified the lack of 
democracy. Sakharov and SoMienitsyn, while politically at odds over how best to 
rectify the lack of personal liberties in the nation, both were committed to bring 
awareness to society. In many ways they represent the value of democratic discourse, 
that is, opposing opinions that operate in an effort to understand another's 
perspective. Sakharov's call for an "open" society reflected the political need to 
include people in issues that affected societal welfare and progress instead of 
Growing up a wall of governmental intolerance. Solzhenitsyn appeals to a limited 
role for government in public discourse, a characteristic of democratic systems. Both 
men saw the injustices created by rejecting a public forum £md not holding the 
political power accountable. 
I l l  
While it is not the intent of this thesis to hold Western democratic values up as 
the preferred standard, tiiere continues to be merit in the political theories presented 
by J. S. Mil, especially in the context of the problems which resulted after glasnost 
was introduced. Sunmiarily, Mill argues that the value which aUows society to 
progress is tolerance of diversity of opinions, and if suppressed by the authority widi 
majority approval, fliere is a violation committed against the people for failing to 
respect an alternative opinion. Mill's definition of liberty centers around the 
necessity for the public to engage in debate in pursuit of the truth. Therefore, the idea 
that authority can silence the public to avoid the unpleasant truth suggests that one 
opinion is infallible and rejects an alternative opinion. Such an attitude is maintained, 
not in the interest of progress and &e pursuit of truth, but rather to enforce singleness 
of mind and to hold onto power for fear of opposition.^ 
Most provocative are Ae words of Gorbachev in Perestroika tiiat spoke of the 
necessity of truth in public information. Yet, as Grorbachev appealed to the virtues of 
public debate in order that perestroika could progress, he consistently reverted to 
Party practices of strangling any point of view that threatened the power of the 
Communist Party. The most revealing actions taken on the part of the Party to 
enforce compliance came about between 1988 and 1991, exactly corresponding to tiie 
time glasnost became powerful in raising awareness. 
Glasnost, in effect, became Gorbachev's enemy for two reasons. Primarily 
because glasnost defied the Party's singular consciousness which was unacceptable to 
Gortxachev as leader of the Soviet Union. It was not a question of whether Gorbachev 
^ John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York; The Liberal Arts Press, 1993), 64. 
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believed in the capability of the Party, or the Marxist-Leninist doctrines which he 
tiiought had penetrated into the core of society without disturbing the autocratic 
integrity. It was not even a question of exploring "new thinking" to bolster the 
system that Gorbachev believed would endure. In reading Gorbachev's speeches and 
book Perestroika, it is evident that he had no intention of deviating from Leninist 
objectives. Thus, "new flunking" only meant for Goitachev rearranging things to be 
more compliant to the goals which were put down in 1917. 
Doder and Branson, Shane, Sakharov, and Solzhenitsyn all speak to the notion that 
reform for Gorbachev meant preserving the authority of the Party with fringe 
democratization. Notably, Gorbachev stresses in Perestroika that the system was 
flexible enough to withstand democracy and declares his reform program to be a 
success among working people. It is impossible not to detect the narrowness of his 
intended policies, economic resurgence and a more efiicient bureaucratic 
administration. The whole perestroika "revolution" barely scratched the surface of 
inherent problems that haunted tiie Soviet state—the lack of democratic resolve. Yes, 
Gorbachev made reference to "letting in more light" under glasnost and yes, he caUed 
for an increase in democratic procedure, but in no way did he ever suspect that 
glasnost was completely incompatible with flie system, past, present, and future. 
The term, glasnost, was sparingly referred to in the Perestroika volume yet under 
glasnost tiie crux of the problems that had led Russia and the Soviet Union into an 
existence of decay became magnified. For centuries Russians have been exploited by 
their own government. When Lenin came to power it never occurred to him that the 
people were ready to be a part of the system of government, not just producers for the 
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State economy. Power imder Lenin and the Party essentially excluded the people 
from sociopolitical issues, therefore sociopolitical progress. 
Gorbachev's reform glasnost suipassed governing interests to include the people's 
opinions, the second reason why glasnost alienated Gorbachev. Glasnost defied 
Gk)rbachev's objectives because the former Soviet leader failed to imderstand the 
democratic need for social participation that transcended economics. Consequently, 
as glasnost began to encourage an airing of opinions, tiie public became consumers of 
information instead of producers of goods. Essentially, information became the 
enemy of the Party in a way for which Gorbachev was never prepared. As Shane 
comments, those who opposed perestroika and glasnost for fear of the collapse of the 
Party order were correct. Moreover, Grorbachev's contention in Memoirs that he 
sincerely wanted democratization for the nation while insisting that the Party line was 
most favorable suggests that he continued to hold Marxism-Leninism in higher 
esteem than the population of the Soviet Union. Such discrepancies in Gorbachev's 
perspective point to a lack of understanding in matters of civil participation. While 
he embraced reform, and encouraged glasnost, Gorbachev continued to stress the 
advantages of Leninism and of socialist democracy, neither one of which held any 
democratic agenda for the individual or society. 
Glasnost could never fulfill Gorbachev's expectations as Soviet leader, but the 
democracy that glasnost effected propelled the information revolution through the 
entire nation within four years of being initiated. Consequently, glasnost toppled the 
Soviet myth, created by Lenin and perpetuated by decades of propaganda. More 
importantly, glasnost challenged the system that exacted terror against its citizens 
throu^ ruthless enforcement, a trademark of both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. 
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Openness of communication spirited away any hope of social unity under 
Par^ auspices, yet the open forum of information that glasnost created took on a 
power of its own. For the Russian people glasnost presented the truth about their one-
Party system that brought a painful reality, but also the hope for continued democratic 
order. The August coup of 1991, staged against Gorbachev by Party hardliners was 
crushed by pubUc opposition and a defiant political plurality never before present in 
the nation. The results of glasnost encouraged democratic principles of participation 
and competition. The actions of the cmispirators spoke only of seizing political 
power in an illegitimate fashion, a typical Party characteristic that was not 
democratic. Shane comments on the events of that month as precariously tipped 
toward the old order of dictatorship, specifically the repression of information. The 
trend of glasnost defined "new thixiking," but not according to the old govermnent, 
which ^e failed coup illustrates. 
Primarily, glasnost, according to Gorbachev's interpretation was not successful; 
however, glasnost, according to the interpretation of the public was a success. By 
extending the rights of expression through glasnost Grorbachev unintentionally 
allowed the pubUc consciousness to come into being on a legitimate scale. 
Thereafter, the direction in which glasnost leads the former Soviet Union can only be 
attributed to the people. Plurality of opinion serves the interest of the people, and the 
necessity for freedom of information is a virtue in a democratic society. The mistake 
that Gorbachev made was in expecting that openness, glasnost, would lead logically 
to communist values and neglect the value of individuaUty. The real fault, as Shane 
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comments, "is laid at the feet not just of Stalin but of Lenin and the Revolution,"^ 
for implementing a system of intolerance against the individuals that contributed to 
the nation. Glasnost not only challenged the system, at a pubUc level, but produced a 
new social standard that finally embraced the democracy Gorbachev encouraged and 
finally eradicated repressive poUtics practiced by the Communist Party. 
^ Scott Shane, Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
Publisher, 1994), 122. 
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